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Perhaps it is merely a reflection of my interests, but to my mind, 
empirical research requires a certain risk-preferent boldness. I like projects 
that explore how and why particular businesses make important decisions. 
After I identify a topic, I typically try to gather as much qualitative and 
quantitative information about it as I can, with the expectation that when I 
have learned a great deal about the topic something interesting will emerge 
that relates in some important way to an ongoing academic debate. Those 
projects usually do not begin with a specific hypothesis to prove or 
disprove—often either answer will produce a publishable result. The 
hypothesis I wish to test often emerges only after considerable work has 
been done, which creates a considerable risk that much effort will be 
invested to no productive end. 
The success of that type of inquiry obviously is in the eye of the 
beholder, and I certainly am biased in thinking that I rarely have 
undertaken such a project without finding something that is interesting. It 
is common, however, that the results of such projects will be far removed 
from my expectations. Specifically, I often begin a project expecting that it 
will address a particular question, but finish the project emphasizing a 
question that was not on my initial list of inquiries. That is particularly 
true in interview-based projects, where the knowledge base I gain 
frequently alters my perspective so substantially that my views at the 
beginning of the project seem unsophisticated or even odd by the time the 
project is complete. A common pattern is to begin with a rough idea of 
what the data suggest, do some interviews that generate plausible 
hypotheses, and then examine those hypotheses in light of a relatively 
targeted data collection. 
This is just such a project. Dan Keating asked me to speak at the F. 
Hodge O’Neal Symposium to discuss a topic related to IP and bankruptcy. 
I responded that I had a data set of failed high-tech companies, together 
with data about their patent portfolios that should allow me to investigate 
the role of a patent portfolio in determining whether bankruptcy is the 
most effective method of liquidating the company. As discussed below, 
my research on that topic is inconclusive. Rather, the focus of my paper is 
on two topics only loosely related to my original inquiry. The first is a 
topic about which I knew almost nothing when I began this work: the use 
of a privately arranged assignment for the benefit of creditors (“ABC”) as 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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a substitute for bankruptcy. In its most unqualified form, my argument is 
that California high-tech firms—an important group given the role of 
California in high-tech industries—systematically use bankruptcy less than 
firms in other states, and that this practice follows directly from California 
legal rules that make the process for ABCs more streamlined in California 
than it is in other states. 
The second, with potentially broader significance, is that data gathered 
from the files of the bankrupt firms in the data set provides a unique 
glimpse of the capital structure of mid-size business bankruptcies,1 which 
shows a startling amount of assets and debt both secured and unsecured. 
Contrary to the idea that venture-backed firms have simple capital 
structures with few claimants,2 and that they have substantially no 
valuable assets when they fail, the average bankrupt firm in the data set 
reported tangible assets of more than $20 million, claims of secured 
creditors of about $14 million, and claims of unsecured creditors of about 
$34 million. That data, together with the results of my interviews about 
why those firms seek relief in bankruptcy, supports a much-improved 
understanding of exactly what benefits the bankruptcy system provides 
that firms could not obtain by contracts among themselves. 
The paper proceeds in three steps: a description of the quantitative data 
and interviews collected for this paper; statistical analysis of the 
quantitative data, informed by the results of the interviews; and discussion 
of the theoretical and policy implications of my findings. 
I. COLLECTING THE DATA 
At the highest level of generality, the purpose of this project is to 
contribute to an understanding of how managers of a failing firm choose 
among the various options that confront them: When do they file for 
bankruptcy? When do they suffer a foreclosure instead of filing for 
 1. As is evident from the literature surveyed in infra note 3, much of the existing literature 
focuses either on very large cases or on a complete sample of cases from a particular district or 
districts, a procedure that tends to produce cases much smaller than the cases in the data set I examine 
here. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses 
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 520–21 (1999) (reporting mean assets of business bankruptcy 
cases of about $700,000, compared to files here with mean tangible assets of about $22 million). 
 2. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 956 (2001) [hereinafter 
Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights] (arguing that “debt rarely appears in the capital structure” of a 
venture-backed firm and such a firm thus “is not eligible for bankruptcy”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert 
K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 781 (2002) [hereinafter Baird & 
Rasmussen, The End] (“High-tech . . . startups have very little debt.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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bankruptcy? When do they simply turn the assets over to a lender or equity 
investor? When do they voluntarily sell the company to a third party 
because they are unable to continue operations? There is of course a 
considerable body of empirical literature dealing with what happens to 
firms when they file for bankruptcy.3 There also is a smaller, though well-
defined, body of business and finance literature that attempts to build a 
model that predicts what firms are likely to file for bankruptcy in the 
future.4 There is not, however, any significant work that looks at a data set 
of failed firms and analyzes, among a universe of firms that have failed, 
which firms choose to file for bankruptcy and which firms choose to use 
other mechanisms for dealing with financial distress.5 Although this work 
 3. There is a great deal of this work by law professors. For example, Lynn LoPucki has written 
on small businesses in the early days of Chapter 11. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full 
Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983) 
(Part I); Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983) (Part II) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor in Full 
Control (Parts I & II)]. In addition, he has authored a series of papers with William C. Whitford 
regarding large-firm bankruptcies in the 1980s. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, 
Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate 
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 669 (1993); Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M. 
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11 (1991). Bob Rasmussen 
and Douglas Baird have done some recent work about business bankruptcies. E.g., Douglas G. Baird 
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & 
Rasmussen, Twilight]. Work by Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook reports results from 
their large ongoing empirical study with Terry Sullivan of business bankruptcies. Elizabeth Warren & 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Empirical Intervention]; Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, supra note 1; Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 (1994). Edward R. Morrison also has 
written recently with Douglas Baird about business bankruptcies in Chicago. See Douglas Baird & 
Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001); Edward R. 
Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Small Business Bankruptcies (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com). There is a more general body of work by 
scholars in other disciplines. E.g., Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and 
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (2003); David C. Smith & Per 
Strömberg, Maximizing the Value of Distressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient 
Reorganization of Firms (2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com). 
 4. E.g., Paul Asquith, et al., Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond 
Issuers, 109 Q.J. ECON. 625 (1994); Harlan D. Platt & Marjorie B. Platt, Predicting Corporate 
Financial Distress: Reflections on Choice-Based Sample Bias, 26 J. ECON. & FIN. 184 (2002); Edward 
I. Altman, Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and Zeta Models (July 
2000) (working paper, available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~ealtman/Zscores.pdf); Matthias Kahl, 
Financial Distress as a Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States (Oct. 2002) (working 
paper, available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/16-01/). 
 5. The closest paper with which I am familiar is Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, Resolving 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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looks more broadly at pre-bankruptcy firms, it provides a valuable 
perspective on the theories of the existing literature, largely because it 
provides a rare opportunity to see precisely what firms can do without 
resorting to bankruptcy. 
In related work addressing patenting and venture capital investments,6 I 
used a data set that includes a considerable amount of information about a 
specific and important group of failed high-tech firms. Specifically, my 
research uses the VentureSource database operated by VentureOne to 
collect information about venture-backed firms.7 That database includes a 
variety of pieces of information about firms that have received financing 
from venture-capital investors. The data are collected by quarterly surveys 
of venture-capital investors, supplemented by frequent contacts with 
executives at the venture-backed firms.8 Although the literature makes it 
clear that the data are not entirely accurate, they are reasonably complete9 
and commonly used in papers examining the venture-capital industry.10 
Moreover, I can think of no reason why the inaccuracies in that data would 
introduce any particular bias with respect to the questions I address.11
For this project, the most important data point is an indicator of the 
status of the company. One of the status possibilities is that the company is 
“out of business.”12 Recognizing the significance of that data point for the 
Financial Distress by Way of a Contract: An Empirical Study of Small UK Companies (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236098). 
 6. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry? (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 7. That database is proprietary, but Venture Source kindly has granted me complimentary 
access for the purposes of this research. 
 8. See Dow Jones Venture One, Industry Information: Research Methodology, at 
www.ventureone.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). For a published description, see PAUL GOMPERS & 
JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 335–37 (1999). 
 9. See Steven N. Kaplan et al., How Well Do Venture Capital Databases Reflect Actual 
Investments (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://gsbwww.uchico.edu/fac/ 
steven.kaplan/research/kss1.pdf).  
 10. E.g., GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 8, at 95–124; Antonio Davila et al., Venture-Capital 
Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms (Aug. 2002) (working paper, available at http://news-
info.wustl.edu/pdf/gupta_venture_capital.pdf) (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Sridhar Seshadri et al., 
Venture Capital Investing and the “Calcutta Auction” (2003) (paper prepared for XII International 
Torvergata Conference on Banking and Finance, available at http://www.ceistorvergata.it/ 
conferenze&convegni/banking&finance/XII_conference/10DICEMBRE/tucci_uniroma2.pdf). 
 11. The basic problem seems to be that the data set omits a substantial share of the actual 
investments. It is not clear what the reason for the omissions is, but given the method by which the 
data are collected, it is probably simply a matter of oversight by the persons responding to the 
questionnaires. 
 12. The other options are “acquired/merged,” “private and independent,” and “publicly held.” 
The “out of business” category I select for my data set includes firms that have voluntarily sold their 
assets in a liquidation context, filed for bankruptcy, or otherwise ceased to exist, but it does not include 
firms that have done some form of private workout that leaves the firm intact. In the venture capital 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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gap in the literature discussed above, I collected a data set of all the firms 
that had three characteristics: (a) they received a venture-capital 
investment between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002; (b) they 
were shown as “out of business” in the fall of 2003 when I collected my 
data; and (c) they fall within the software, biopharmaceutical, or 
communications sectors.13 I limited my analysis to firms that received 
financing since 2000 because of the concern that it would be more difficult 
to collect information about firms that failed before that time. I selected 
those sectors because they are the three largest sectors and the sectors most 
closely associated with the “high tech” label. I hoped that by using large 
sectors I would be able to investigate the possibility (confirmed in some 
ways below) that the attractiveness of bankruptcy differs in significant 
ways in different types of businesses. 
After I determined the universe of firms that I would study, I collected 
from VentureSource various pieces of information about each firm, 
including the geographic location of the firm, any former names the firm 
may have operated under, the year in which each firm was founded, more 
detailed information about each firm’s line of business, and two proxies 
for the firm’s size (employees and total amount of financing received by 
the firm). I then supplemented that data with information from Delphion 
about the size of each firm’s patent portfolio.14
Next, I turned to the most difficult part of the data collection. Because 
the purpose of the project was to understand how firms choose among the 
context, for example, it is common for a firm to receive “restart” funding that substantially alters the 
direction of the firm. A restart round occurs when a firm’s valuation is significantly reduced and the 
current investors’ stakes are diluted. Restarts have become increasingly common. In years past, they 
comprised 1% or less of all deal flow, but in recent years that figure has risen substantially: to 3% in 
2002 and 6% in 2003. See VentureOne, Equity Financings for US Venture-Backed Companies, by 
Industry Group (1997–4Q’2003), at www.ventureone.com/ii/4Q03_Financing_ Release.xls (Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet) (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). Functionally, they operate much like a reorganization 
in bankruptcy, in the sense that the claims of existing debt claimants often are completely removed and 
that the claims of equity claimants that do not contribute new value are likely to be depressed 
substantially. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone 
Interview with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004). For a thorough analysis of that analogy, see Smith & 
Strömberg, supra note 3. 
 13. I collected the data in December 2003. Because the data set is updated continuously, it would 
be difficult to replicate the exact search. I have downloaded, however, an electronic copy of the entire 
VentureSource record for each firm listed as “out of business” as of December 2003. 
 14. I recorded the total number of patents assigned to each firm as of December 31, 2003. In 
doing the search, I used the present name and any former names provided by VentureOne. My 
experience suggests that such a search does not capture all of the patents assigned to any particular 
entity, particularly where a firm has changed names frequently or where the firm acquires a patent at 
some time after the issuance of that patent. For purposes of this research, however, those errors are 
likely to be unimportant. More importantly, it is not clear that a more replicable method exists for 
defining a universe of patents that belong to particular firms. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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alternative methods of liquidation, the basic problem that I faced was how 
to categorize the various alternatives to bankruptcy and determine how 
often each is used. When the project began, I hoped to produce 
quantitative data as to how many firms in the database used various 
methods such as a foreclosure, voluntary cessation of business, ABC, or 
bankruptcy. Several factors complicated that task. 
First, to the extent that the non-bankruptcy methods involve filings, the 
filings typically are not easily retrievable or searchable. For example, the 
filings for ABCs generally are not in the Secretary of State’s Office, but 
rather in the offices of city and county clerks. That significantly increases 
the number of places at which searches must be conducted. Moreover, 
many of those offices do not maintain their records online; in many cases, 
they will not respond to search inquiries by telephone or email; in some 
cases, they will not even respond to inquiries by conventional mail. Also, 
because the filings are made so rarely, office staff have so little familiarity 
with them that they typically deny the possibility of such a filing: it is of 
course difficult to conduct a search for something in a public office that 
denies that it is obligated to accept such filings. Finally, and most 
importantly, many of the alternatives do not require public filings; there is 
no public filing, for example, associated with a foreclosure under UCC 
Article 9. The combination of those problems makes it impractical to rely 
on public records. 
Similarly, in some states there is no public filing for an ABC.15 Other 
liquidation methods—a hibernation16 or a voluntary surrender of assets to 
creditors or investors—might not involve the kind of discrete event that 
could be captured in a filing. That problem is complicated by the overlap 
between methods—even methods like bankruptcy or a foreclosure that 
involve discrete objective events. Thus, it is common for a secured 
creditor to foreclose and conduct an auction of some assets, while the 
firm’s managers might auction personal property through DoveBid.17 
Another possibility is that the firm might sell different portions of the 
assets to different companies by negotiated sales that occur at different 
times. Finally, and most commonly, the firm might file for bankruptcy 
 15. California is the obvious example.
 16. A hibernation is a process suitable for a firm with technology that is functional but thought to 
be “ahead of its time.” The hibernating firm lays off its employees and ceases operations, hoping that 
the market will improve. For details, see Sherwood Partners, Business Continuity Advisors, at 
http://shrwood.com/hibernation.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). 
 17. For background on that alternative, see Dovebid, at http://www.dovebid.com (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2005). In my data set, 2d Century, Broadband Office, Darwin Networks, and Napster used 
Dovebid to conduct auctions while they were in bankruptcy. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1375 Mann book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1382 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1375 
 
 
 
 
 
 
after engaging in one or more of the other possible options. That overlap 
problem makes it particularly difficult to obtain reliable information from 
interviews. For example, a lender might tell me which firms on the list are 
firms to which she has advanced funds,18 and how many of those firms 
suffered foreclosure, but she might have no recollection of a bankruptcy or 
other disposition that occurred months or years after a foreclosure in 
which the lender was paid much of its outstanding indebtedness. 
Collecting information directly from the failed firms would be even more 
problematic because of the difficulty of locating knowledgeable executives 
years after a firm has failed. 
Another possibility would be to rely on the VentureSource data to 
describe the particular type of liquidation event. That data has much to be 
said for it: it is updated regularly (by quarterly interviews with 
executives), relies on direct connections with knowledgeable firm insiders, 
and includes good financial information about private firms.19 Thus, I 
think it is quite reliable with respect to the point discussed above—the 
collection of a universe of firms that have failed. It is less useful, however, 
with respect to information about the various alternatives. For example, 
the descriptive information in the data set reports that most firms “ceased 
operations,”20 which does not distinguish in a useful way among the 
various options of interest to me. Similarly, there are a large number of 
firms (107, about 15% of 742) for which the descriptive information is 
missing entirely, either because VentureSource “lost contact” with the firm 
or because the entry is simply blank.21 Similarly, the data grossly under-
report bankruptcy filings, for which I have an objective third-party source 
(discussed below): VentureSource shows only 11 bankruptcy filings, while 
my searches found 161.22
One final possibility would have been to rely on media reports, which 
are readily available on the Internet for many of the firms. Unfortunately, 
it became clear that I would not be able to obtain complete coverage 
through media reports. More troubling, it became equally clear to me that 
press reports were not reliable; none, for example, reported an ABC 
 18. That information would be useful because the market for institutional lending to venture-
backed firms is, as my interviews generally suggest, quite concentrated. 
 19. Dow Jones Venture One, Dow Jones Venture Source, at http://ventureone.com (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2005). 
 20. Id. VentureSource used that designation for 28 of the 31 biopharmaceutical firms for which it 
reported an outcome, 148 of the 198 telecommunication firms for which it reported an outcome, and 
252 of the 351 software firms for which it reported an outcome. 
 21. See Dow Jones Venture Source, supra note 19. 
 22. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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(despite data I have collected indicating ABCs for a large number of 
specifically identified firms in the data set) and few reported auctions or 
foreclosures (despite anecdotal evidence from the interviews and Internet 
sites suggesting that those events are common). I also considered the 
possibility of supplementing media reports with targeted surveys sent to 
firms not discussed in the media. The poor results of the VentureSource 
surveys, however, convinced me that such an inquiry would not produce 
reliable information. The basic problem, I think, is that responsible 
business executives at these firms often do not have a concrete 
understanding of the legal choices that their attorneys or creditors have 
made, particularly when there is no bankruptcy filing. 
In the end, then, I decided to limit my quantitative inquiries to two 
relatively objective events: bankruptcy and ABC filings. On the first, I 
used Internet searches of PACER and individual federal-court Websites to 
collect basic information about any bankruptcy filings by the firms.23 In 
cases in which the schedules were not available on PACER, I obtained 
photocopies of the schedules from the relevant courts. With respect to 
ABC filings, I collected information for the four largest states in the data 
set (California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas). For California 
(where there are no public filings), I relied on confidential interviews with 
the four largest firms that facilitate ABCs. For the other three states, which 
do require such filings, I conducted searches in the relevant public 
offices.24
To supplement that quantitative data, I conducted 23 interviews 
(predominantly by telephone, although occasionally in person) with 
individuals who have useful information about the choices I am 
examining: ten lawyers who work in the area,25 four lenders to high-
technology firms,26 five executives at turnaround firms (who typically 
 23. Using the U.S. Party/Case index in PACER, I collected information on all bankruptcies filed 
as of December 31, 2003. With respect to the courts that are not listed on that index (N.D. Ala., S.D. 
Ga., Idaho, S.D. Ind., E.D.N.C., M.D. Tenn., Virgin Islands, and E.D. Wash), I searched in individual 
court databases in the state in which the firm resides. Of course, that may have resulted in some under-
reporting of bankruptcies, either because of discrepancies between the names used in bankruptcy 
filings and the names used in VentureOne (e.g., I did not search for any natural persons) or because of 
the possibility that some non-local firms filed in the districts that are not included in the index. I 
concluded that the latter possibility is insignificant, because most of the non-index districts have an 
insubstantial number of business filings. I found no cases in any of the non-index districts other than 
E.D.N.C. 
 24. As discussed above, the decentralized nature of those filings made that task complicated, 
which is why I limited it to the three largest states in the data set outside of California. 
 25. This group includes five lawyers from California, three from Massachusetts, and two from 
Texas. 
 26. All of the lenders were from institutions with a national presence. Three of the executives 
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handle not only turnarounds but also liquidations),27 three California 
bankruptcy judges, and one venture capital investor with experience in the 
area. As is typical for my work, the interviews were relatively open-ended. 
Suitably redacted transcripts of the interviews will appear on my Website 
when this paper is published.28
II. ANALYZING THE DATA 
A. Summary Data 
The total data set includes 742 firms: 40 in the biopharmaceutical 
(“biopharm”) sector,29 244 in the communications sector,30 and 458 in the 
software sector.31
 
 
 
 
were located in California, one in Texas. 
 27. One of the turnaround firms had a national presence. Of the five individuals, four were 
located in California and one in Massachusetts. 
 28. The posted transcripts will not include material from the interviews with judges and two of 
the attorneys, which were conducted on the basis that I would keep my notes of those conversations 
confidential. 
 29. This sector is comprised primarily of firms engaged in the drug discovery and drug delivery 
subsectors, with a few firms in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical subsectors. 
 30. In addition to internet, wireless and telecommunications service providers, this sector 
includes firms that sell connectivity products, fiber optic equipment, and wireless communications 
equipment. 
 31. This sector is probably the most diverse, with firms that develop business applications 
software, communications and connectivity tools, database software, educational software, games, 
graphics and publishing software, multimedia networking software, and many different types of 
vertical market applications software. 
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Out of the entire population, the total number of bankruptcy filings was 
161, only 22% of all of the failed firms.32 The bankruptcy rates by sector 
ranged from 17% in the software sector to 28% in the biopharm sector and 
29% in the communications sector. Out of the 161 bankruptcy filings, 
there were 68 firms (42%) in Chapter 11 at some point in the process and 
93 firms (58%) that were exclusively in Chapter 7.33 Although I do not 
examine the question in detail in this paper, the regression models reported 
below suggest, as the raw data imply, that bankruptcy filings in the 
software sector are significantly lower than the filings in the biopharm and 
communications sectors, even controlling for firm location and size.34
 
The firms were located in thirty-three states and the District of 
Columbia. Not surprisingly, however, most of the firms were concentrated 
in a small number of states. Thus, the four most populated states included 
almost two-thirds (65%) of the firms. 
 
 
 32. I say “only” because some readers might expect that the majority of failing firms would make 
use of the bankruptcy system. That expectation is not, however, universal. In particular, recent 
literature about venture-backed firms has suggested that those firms do not use bankruptcy at all, 
relying on contracts to “opt out” of the state-provided bankruptcy system. Baird & Rasmussen, 
Control Rights, supra note 2, at 956; Smith & Strömberg, supra note 3. The data set I analyze here is 
direct evidence that a significant group of venture-backed companies do use the bankruptcy system to 
facilitate an effective liquidation of their assets. 
 33. Two of the 68 initially were filed in Chapter 7 and later converted to Chapter 11. For 
purposes of this paper, I treat any firm that was ever in Chapter 11 as being a “Chapter 11 case.” 
Unlike the biopharmaceutical and software sectors where Chapter 7 cases predominated (8 out of 11 in 
biopharmaceutical and 60 out of 80 in software), Chapter 11 cases were predominant in the 
communications sector (45 out of 70). 
 34. Understanding the role that a firm’s industry plays in the decision to file for bankruptcy is an 
important part of the analysis that I have yet to explore fully. However, I do offer some tentative 
hypotheses related to the role of a firm’s industry that relate to my explanation in Part III of the issues 
that motivate firms to use bankruptcy in liquidation. 
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The final data points that I collected from VentureSource are two 
different proxies for the size of the firm: number of employees and total 
amount raised. Both proxies indicated that the communications firms were 
larger than firms in the other sectors. The median number of employees 
ranged from 18 (biopharm) to 30 (software) to 55 (communications). The 
median amount raised ranged from $9 million (software) to $9.5 million 
(biopharm) to $28 million (communications). Table 1 provides summary 
data about the size of the firms. 
Table 1: Capitalization of Dataset by Industry 
 Biopharm 
N=40 
Software 
N=458 
Telecom 
N=244 
Aggregate 
N=742 
Amount 
Raised ($M) 
 
Mean 19 19 55.2 30.9 
1st Quarter 4.0 4.4 10.25  
Median 9.5 9.0 29.0  
3rd Quarter 27.0 20.3 69.0  
St. Dev. 20.3 37.5 81.4  
 
Rounds 
 
Mean 3 2 3 2 
Median 3 2 2  
 
Investors
 
Mean 5 5 7 5 
Median 4 4 5  
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The share of firms that obtained patents differed sharply by sector, 
from 63% (25/40) in biopharm to 26% (64/244) in communications to 
14% (63/458) in software.35 The number of patents per firm differed 
similarly. Overall, those numbers ranged from 3.9 patents per biopharm 
firm, to 1.4 patents per communications firm, to 0.5 patents per software 
firm. Among firms with patents, the respective rates were 6.2 patents per 
patenting biopharm firm, 5.4 patents per patenting communications firm, 
and 3.5 patents per patenting software firm. 
 
B. Intellectual Property and Bankruptcy 
The first hypothesis I investigated was that firms with patents would be 
less likely to file for bankruptcy because of the inadequacies of the 
bankruptcy process as a device for maximizing the value of sophisticated 
intellectual property. For example, one attorney explained: 
[T]he more sophisticated the assets and the more intellectual 
property involved, the more important it is to have the person who 
has a sophistication about them trying to dispose of that. And, again 
that would be an ABC where you get to hand pick [the trustee, so 
that you can use a sophisticated liquidator] as opposed to a 
bankruptcy trustee.36
 
 
 35. This sectoral difference resembles the data I report from a slightly different data set in Mann, 
supra note 6. 
 36. Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003); see also Telephone 
Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004). 
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As it happens, however, the data do not support that hypothesis. By each 
of the measures that I tested, the relation between a patent portfolio and 
the likelihood that the failed firm will choose to file for bankruptcy is 
essentially random. 
On reflection, bolstered by discussion in a number of interviews, this 
makes sense. Many of the interview subjects insisted that firms with 
strong IP assets would be deterred from filing for bankruptcy, but on 
questioning it became clear that what they meant by strong IP assets was 
any type of asset that was “high-tech,” whether or not a patent protected 
it.37 The loose relation between patents and valuable technologies 
aggravates that problem: not all valuable technology is patented and not all 
patented technology is valuable.38 Thus, because the population is by 
definition a set of firms with predominantly high-technology assets, the 
existence of patents does not directly address the relevant question. In the 
end, those interviews suggest that I would find a significant effect, 
inversely related to bankruptcy filings, between high-technology industries 
and other industries. At this time, however, I do not have data with which 
to investigate that question.39
 37. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview 
with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround 
Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003). 
 38. For example, sophisticated companies will protect many valuable innovations as trade 
secrets, without patents. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
3, 9–10 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 683, 709 (1980). Conversely, the great majority of patents plainly have little commercial 
value. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A 
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=426020) 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
 39. At least in recent years, most venture capital investments have been made in high-tech 
industries. Thus, the various databases of venture capital investments are not useful for constructing a 
data set of failed firms in industries with hard-core tangible assets. Moreover, I am not aware of any 
other data set of failed firms. Although secretaries of state have records on firms whose charters have 
been suspended, revoked, or forfeited, my experience suggests that information about firm charters 
does not say much about what actually happened to the firm or the time at which a firm actually ceases 
to exist. Among other things, firms often will fail to dissolve formally at the time they cease to do 
business, often because of the fee the state requires for formal dissolution. Interview with Second 
Texas Attorney (Sept. 23, 2004). In some states, there also might be data about charters revoked for 
failure to pay franchise taxes. Those data, however, are likely to differ substantially from state to state 
based on differences in local tax systems. Id. Thus, they provide little basis for a national study such as 
this. There is also some census data and data collected by the Small Business Administration about 
firm failures, but those data do not include any specific information about particular firms. 
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C. Location and Bankruptcy 
1. The Basic Hypothesis: Location and Bankruptcy 
a. Formulating the Basic Hypothesis 
The most productive hypothesis that I investigated was one that was 
not apparent to me when I began this project, but quickly emerged in 
interviews. This is the notion that bankruptcies of high-technology firms 
should be relatively less common in California because of the common use 
in that state of the ABC procedure.40 The process is governed for the most 
part by provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure.41 Among 
other things, those provisions require the assignee to provide written 
notice to all creditors and equity holders within 30 days of the 
assignment.42 The notice must include a “bar date,” between 150 and 180 
days after the date of the notice, by which creditors must file claims 
against the estate.43 The statute also permits the assignee to recover 
preferences in a provision modeled on Bankruptcy Code § 547.44 Finally, 
 40. The best general introduction to an ABC is an American Bankruptcy Institute publication 
written by a California professional in the industry: GEOFFREY L. BERMAN, GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2000). See also Geoffrey L. Berman, 
Common Law Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The Reemergence of the Non-Bankruptcy 
Alternative, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 357 (1993) (describing specifically the California ABC); Mike C. 
Buckley & Gregory Sterling, What Banks Need to Know About ABCs, 120 BANKING L.J. 48 (2003); 
David S. Kupetz, Note, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Exit Vehicle of Choice for Many Dot-
Com, Technology, and Other Troubled Enterprises, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 71 (2001). 
 41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1800–1802 (West Supp. 2005). 
 42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1802(a) (West Supp. 2005). The assignor is obligated to provide the 
assignee a complete list, with addresses, of the parties entitled to notice. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1802(c) (West Supp. 2005). That of course leaves open the possibility that the assignor either 
intentionally or inadvertently will omit some creditors from the list. The statute does not address the 
significance of omission from the list, but presumably omission from the list and consequent lack of 
notice would raise the possibility that the proceeding did not bind the creditor in question. E.g., Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) (analyzing that aspect of a similar Arkansas law). My 
interview subjects report that assignees are careful to notify tax creditors, fearing that they would be 
personally liable for tax claims that would have been entitled to payment if they had received notice 
and presented a claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000) (providing for such a priority for federal tax 
claims); Kupetz, supra note 40, at 80; Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Sept. 23, 
2004) (discussing likelihood that an assignee would face a similar liability to unnotified state tax 
creditors). 
 43. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1802(b) (West Supp. 2005). 
 44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1800 (West Supp. 2005). That statute is not unique. As David Skeel 
notes, almost half (22 at the time that he wrote) of the states have provisions for the avoidance of 
preferences. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 556 (1994). The statutes appear to be historical relics of the time 
before Congress adopted a permanent federal bankruptcy law, when only the states were attending to 
the problems of insolvency. 
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it includes some statutory priorities modeled on Bankruptcy Code 
§ 502(b).45
The interviews with lawyers and turnaround professionals in California 
reflect a consistent understanding that an ABC often is superior to 
bankruptcy as a mechanism for liquidating a failed high-tech company. 
The basic point is that an experienced assignee is superior to a Chapter 7 
trustee because of three advantages the assignee has over the trustee in 
Chapter 7: the assignee can act more quickly; the assignee is likely to be 
more experienced at dealing with technology-related assets; and the use of 
an assignee involves lower transaction costs.46
On the first point, the assignee often can dispose of the assets within 
just a few days of the assignment, if the assignee is satisfied that it already 
has located the best buyer for the assets.47 Surprisingly, the interviews 
suggested that the optimal buyer often is so obvious that the assignor 
identifies the ultimate buyer in the earliest conversations with the potential 
assignee.48 A trustee in bankruptcy, in contrast, rarely would be able to sell 
an entire business so quickly after a bankruptcy filing.49
The second point is related to the first. In California, at least, the 
assignee is likely to be one of a handful of companies that specialize in 
serving as an assignee in these circumstances. Because these companies 
exist largely to extract value from the assets of failed companies, it is 
plausible that their experience—if only the “bigger rolodex” of contacts 
from past transactions50—would produce greater returns than a trustee.51 
 45. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1204–1204.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). 
 46. Nobody would suggest that an ABC is always superior. There are a variety of transaction-
specific financial reasons why bankruptcy might be preferable, such as cases in which bankruptcy 
priorities would be lower than the priorities under the state statute and cases in which bankruptcy tax 
benefits are important. See Interview with Fifth California Attorney (Jan. 7, 2005). 
 47. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003). 
 48. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). 
 49. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003). 
 50. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004). 
 51. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003) (explaining that “the 
trustees that you get in a Chapter 7 case aren’t very good at selling intellectual property” and that an 
ABC gives a firm access to “someone who will actually do a better job selling the intellectual property 
than the trustee would”); Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003) 
(explaining that ABCs can produce the “highest and best price” for the assets of a failed firm); 
Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) (“[T]he assignee in an ABC is just 
more likely to be more sophisticated than a bankruptcy trustee—will do a better job maximizing the 
value of the assets and will do it in a quick way so that creditors of the company will generally come 
out ahead.”); Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003) (“[B]ankruptcy 
trustees typically are not good at or willing to invest the effort to sell intellectual property. . . . 
Bankruptcy trustees are usually lawyers, they’re not IP experts, they don’t have a staff of people who 
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That is true not simply because of a variation in expertise, but also because 
of the undoubtedly excessive workload that faces the typical bankruptcy 
trustee.52 The fact that experienced creditors commonly consent to the 
process suggests that the returns are higher than returns in a bankruptcy.53
A related point is the ready ability of the assignee to use the services of 
employees with knowledge of the technology that is useful in maximizing 
the sales price.54 Although it is not impossible for a business in Chapter 7 
to continue paying employees, it is not easy:  
go in and deal with the nuance of something like an intellectual property asset. Patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, software, operating systems, biotechnology assets, communications assets, they’re just not 
experts in it.”); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) (“[O]ne of the 
really great benefits that I think is perceived frequently by the directors and officers of these tech 
companies, is here they can go out and they can select who the assignee is, they can meet with the 
assignee upfront, and can be comfortable that the assignee really does have the expertise and 
experience to try to maximize value. . . . They don’t have to encounter an unknown trustee like they 
would if they were to file a Chapter 7.”); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional 
(Dec. 17 & 19, 2003) (suggesting that an assignment is preferable “if the goal is to maximize value 
and put the assets back in the economic stream, quickly and efficiently”); Telephone Interview with 
Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004) (“I do think that nine times out of ten, you’re better off having 
a Sherwood Partners or a Diablo Management or some other turnaround assignee looking to liquidate 
the assets than handing it over to a Chapter 7 trustee.”); Telephone Interview with Venture Investor 
(Apr. 16, 2004) (“[W]hen you have the ABC option, you get 98% of the benefits of bankruptcy for 
about one-tenth the cost.”). 
 52. See Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003). The creditors do 
have the right under Bankruptcy Code § 702 to appoint their own trustee even in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. But because such an appointment probably would not occur for about a month after the 
bankruptcy it would be a poor substitute for an ABC procedure that can complete a transfer in a matter 
of days. 
 53. Although my interviews do not suggest it, another possibility suggested by a reader of an 
early draft is that insiders prefer the ABC process because they have greater control over the ABC 
professional than they would have over a trustee. The interviews with lenders suggest, however, that 
lenders actually worry about an ABC process because they have less control than they would have in 
the more formal bankruptcy process. Thus, lenders tend to view the lack of control in an ABC as a 
counterbalance to a perceived greater monetary recovery. As one California Lender stated: 
I think from a creditor’s perspective the one negative is that you don’t necessarily have all of 
the checks and balances that a bankruptcy court trustee might add to the process. And so, 
there’s an accounting. They kind of get comfortable with the folks who are doing it because 
you know there have been some decent outcomes, but in the back of my mind I’m always 
thinking, the one dropback [sic] here is there’s probably not as much control, or creditors 
don’t feel as if there’s as much control in the process. 
Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); see also Interview with Second 
California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004) (similar perspective). 
 54. See First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second California 
Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004); 
Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) (“One thing that we’ve found is, you 
get more value out of that technology or the intellectual property if you can keep the people around it 
who can actually explain it, make it work, and help whoever wants to purchase it or use it, help them 
make it successful.”). 
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[W]hen was the last time you saw a Chapter 7 trustee want to 
operate a company? He can get special authority to do so. It takes 
an order of the court to do so. To do it you need cash collateral steps 
. . . You need notice and all that other stuff to do it. So the Chapter 7 
trustee almost never runs a company pending a sale.55
By contrast, it is relatively simple for an assignee to complete a sale 
without first having to close the business. In a typical arrangement, the 
assignor might approach the assignee with a potential purchaser. The 
assignee would conduct due diligence about the sale before taking an 
assignment. If the assignee concluded that the sale was appropriate, it then 
would take an assignment and complete the sale almost simultaneously, 
sending notice to creditors promptly after the assignment and sale.56 
Several months later, after receiving and examining all of the relevant 
claims, funds would be distributed.57 As one attorney who described that 
process to me remarked, “[N]o bankruptcy trustee can do that.”58
Finally, and perhaps least important, the net cost of the process seems 
to be less than a bankruptcy proceeding.59 This is thought to be true, even 
though the assignee charges a fee that seems to be much higher than the 
typical fee a trustee would charge,60 because liquidation through an ABC 
 55. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 56. See id.; Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). 
 57. Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). Indeed, secured 
creditors and priority creditors often would be paid earlier, whenever funds were available for such 
claims. Id. 
 58. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); see also Telephone 
Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) (describing a similar scenario). 
 59. There is of course a substantial amount of literature, much of it empirical, documenting the 
transaction costs of business bankruptcies. See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, 
Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207 (1997); 
Stephen P. Ferris et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small-Firm 
Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847; Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs 
and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); Karen Hopper Wruck, Financial 
Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 436–39 (1990). Most, 
if not all, of that literature is beside the relevant point here—that a bankruptcy imposes a substantial 
amount of fixed costs which do not vary with the size of the firm and which can be avoided through 
the use of alternative liquidation procedures. To the relevant decisionmakers, those costs present a 
floor: if the alternate procedure costs less than those fixed costs, it will save money. The point here is 
simply that experienced executives in California believe that ABCs often cost less than the minimum 
costs of a formal bankruptcy proceeding. 
 60. The typical trustee’s fee would be 3%. Several subjects suggested a typical minimum fee for 
a sophisticated assignee of $75,000–$100,000, see Telephone Interview with Third California 
Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 
2003), with the general percentage fee being about 7.5% of the proceeds. See Telephone Interview 
with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003); see also Katherine Goncharoff, Fade 
Away (July 17, 2002), at http://www.shrwood.com/media_td_0207.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) 
(same). 
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avoids the transaction costs associated with a typical Chapter 7 
bankruptcy—costs of formal notices to creditors, attorney’s fees 
associated with the bankruptcy process, and the like. One California 
attorney explained the point at length: 
From the debtor’s side you have to file bankruptcy schedules and do 
the formality of that, you have to attend at least a single hearing. 
And, so you’ve paid a lawyer, and you’ve done that stuff and that’s 
gone on. And the bankruptcy trustee comes in. If the trustee thinks 
it’s complicated enough, the trustee has a lawyer and sometimes an 
accountant. And so those are all going to be costs of administration. 
And then there is just going to be the time. And the time elongates 
in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, months just go on and on and on, so 
they get to be expensive. So what is it going to cost? A little 
company may file bankruptcy for $6,500 or $10,000—you know 
that is not a huge fee when it comes time to liquidate something. 
But in terms of the delays and everything else, you may be talking 
about doubling or tripling that in terms of the administrative costs as 
you go through the system of the bankruptcy trustee and his counsel 
and the like. 
If you do an assignment all you do is you do a board of directors’ 
resolution. You make the assignment, which is typically a 
preprinted form. You give a list of creditors. The assignor has now 
completed his work. The assignee takes the assets and while it too 
has a choice of engaging counsel or what have you, if it’s just going 
to be an asset liquidation, often times there are no professionals 
hired at all. It’s just the assignee takes it, does due diligence to see if 
the sale is good, and makes a sale.61
When the topic initially was mentioned in interviews, I was skeptical. I 
had assumed that one of the most difficult aspects of a workable process 
for a non-bankruptcy transfer of assets would be to ensure that the assets 
were transferred free of existing or potential liabilities. In California at 
least, professionals seem to think that is not a serious problem.62 Part of 
the reason is the nature of the firms that I am studying, venture-backed 
 61. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); see also Telephone 
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (similar discussion). 
 62. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003) (describing the 
ability to provide title free and clear of claims as “one of the . . . fundamental principles that an ABC is 
all about”); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) (ability to sell free 
and clear is the “whole concept” of an ABC). 
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firms that have not yet gone public.63 Interview subjects assumed that the 
main risk would be after-the-fact suits for breach of fiduciary duty in 
connection with the assignment. They argued, however, that such suits are 
relatively unlikely in that context because the major outside equity 
investors are venture capitalists, who are unlikely to get involved in that 
kind of litigation.64 Because the firms often have not yet started selling 
products and are unlikely to have complicated debt structures, the 
likelihood of later disputes is smaller than it is for companies that are more 
mature or have more intricate debt structures.65 Yet, neither the statutes 
nor the cases in California specifically validate the title of a purchaser 
from the assignee.66 Rather, it is more likely that the willingness to take 
that risk is driven by the economic motivation of the higher returns that an 
ABC can bring: 
Sometimes, if everything else is equal, a buyer, generally speaking, 
would prefer to have a bankruptcy court order blessing the 
acquisition. But frequently, because the assignment process can 
work so smoothly and efficiently, the benefits of doing an 
 63. That is an artifact of my data set of course, but more broadly ABCs are rare for public 
companies because of the shareholder approvals that typically are required for an ABC but not for a 
bankruptcy filing. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). For a 
more general discussion of the policy implications of the public company dynamic, see infra note 159. 
 64. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Re-interview) (Mar. 30, 2004). It 
also is relevant that the venture capitalists may fear suit by the owners for their own responsibility for 
the shutdown, which might make them reluctant to institute litigation challenging the liquidation 
decisions of the entrepreneurs. See Maria Guzzo, InfoSAGE Sues Mellon Ventures: Software Firm 
Claims Fund Foiled Financing Plan, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, available at http://www.biz 
journals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2002/02/11/story2.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). The problem is 
that the relations between venture capitalists and those in whom they invest necessarily give the 
venture capitalists control over the decision to terminate the firm’s operations. See e.g., GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 8, ch. 12; William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital 
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506–14 (1990); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial 
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts (2000) 
(NBER Working Paper No. 7660, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/ 
kaplanstrom.pdf) (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). For a complementary perspective, one California lender 
emphasized that the reason that it is difficult to use ABCs for public firms is because the 
representatives of the public debt holders are much more likely to resort to litigation than the firms that 
are likely to have extended credit to privately held venture-backed firms. See Telephone Interview 
with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004). 
 65. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). Similarly, those 
firms may be less likely than more mature firms to have serious concerns about other common types of 
unliquidated and unmatured liabilities—environmental claims, personal injury claims, IP infringement 
claims, or securities fraud. The simple fact is that the outstanding liabilities of firms that have not yet 
started selling products are more predictable than the outstanding liabilities of firms that have broader 
operations. 
 66. The laws in the other jurisdictions that I examined (New York, Massachusetts, and Texas) 
are no more clear on this point than those in California. 
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assignment outweigh the fact that you’re not gonna have any court 
order as the buyer.67
b. Testing the Basic Hypothesis 
The interviews with California professionals support the basic 
hypothesis that failed high-tech companies in California should choose 
bankruptcy less frequently than failed high-tech companies in other 
locations. Unfortunately, it is not easy to test that hypothesis directly. 
Because California law does not require any public filing, I could not 
collect information on which California firms used ABCs. Accordingly, I 
tested the corollary hypothesis that bankruptcy rates are lower in 
California. The data provide considerable support for that hypothesis. 
Looking at the raw data, for example, the bankruptcy rate overall was 
about 17%, but it was only 14% in California. Because the data strongly 
suggested that bankruptcy rates varied by size of firm and by industry, I 
decided to analyze the data more carefully by using a logistic68 regression 
with a dependent variable of whether the firm filed for any kind of 
bankruptcy. I included independent variables for the existence of patents 
(“PAT”), the industry of the firm (“BIOPHARM,” “COMM,” “SFTWR”), 
the size by employees (“SMLEMP,” “MEDEMP,” “LRGEMP”), the size 
by amount raised (“SMLAM,” “MEDAM,” “LARGAM”), and whether 
the firm was located in California (“CA”). As the table below shows,69 
location in California was significant at the 1% level. The negative 
coefficient, like the low odds ratio,70 indicates an inverse correlation with 
bankruptcy filings. A goodness-of-fit test indicates that addition of the CA 
location variable significantly improves the model compared to a model 
without a location variable. 
 67. Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16. 2003). 
 68. I used a logistic regression instead of an OLS regression because the dependent variable 
(bankruptcy filing) is binary. 
 69. In the data analysis, the reference category for industry is software, so I report coefficients 
and odds ratios for the differences in the biopharmaceutical and telecommunication sectors from 
software firms. Similarly, the reference categories for amount raised and employees were the 
categories for the larger firms. Thus, the tables report coefficients and odds ratios for the differences 
between small and medium firms and large firms. 
 70. An odds ratio below 1.0 indicates that the dependent variable is found less frequently in the 
category in question than in the reference category; an odds ratio above 1.0 indicates that the 
dependent variable occurs more frequently in the category in question than in the reference category. 
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Table 2: California and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.352 
(0.228) 
0.703 
PAT  0.061 
(0.248) 
1.063 
BIOPHARM  0.931* 
(0.436) 
2.537 
COMM  0.400 
(0.222) 
1.492 
SMLEMP -1.392*** 
(0.337) 
0.249 
MEDEMP -0.799** 
(0.254) 
0.450 
SMLAM -0.486 
(0.355) 
0.615 
MEDAM -0.154 
(0.251) 
0.857 
CA -0.805*** 
(0.217) 
0.447 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
 
To bolster the argument that the prevalence of ABCs is an important 
reason for suppressed bankruptcy filings in California, it would have been 
useful to collect information about the number of ABC filings. As 
discussed above, I was not able to do that in a systematic way. I was able, 
however, to collect from the four turnaround firms that I interviewed the 
number (but not the identities) of the California firms in the data set, 
organized by industry, for which each of those firms had served as 
assignees in an ABC.71 Figure 5 shows how those numbers—which reflect 
30 ABCs (about 10% of all failed California firms)—relate to the expected 
 
 
 71. Given the high concentration of expertise my interviews suggested, I think it is likely that my 
inquiries identified the overwhelming majority of California ABCs in my data set. 
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and actual number of bankruptcy filings in California. Generally, it 
suggests that the number of ABCs is a substantial fraction of the total 
bankruptcy filings. My efforts to locate similar filings in Massachusetts, 
New York, and Texas (the next three largest states in the data set) indicate 
that one firm in Massachusetts (out of about seventy five) and that none of 
the approximately 100 firms in New York and Texas used the ABC 
procedure. 
 
2. Refining the Hypothesis 
a. Trying to Separate Law and Culture 
That finding led me to seek more information about exactly why and 
how a preference for ABCs operates in California. Some, but not all, of 
the interviews suggested that the preference for ABCs was a cultural norm 
fostered in northern California. For example, one Palo Alto attorney 
explained that “it has a lot to do with whether you are in the Valley or not. 
Because the farther you get away from the sort of technology centers, the 
more likely it is that a company will go into bankruptcy.”72 In its most 
aggressive form, the preference reflected the view that people in northern 
California understand that the sophisticated and effective way to liquidate 
failing high-tech firms is to use an ABC. Other locales use different 
methods because the lawyers and lenders in those areas are less 
sophisticated. The premise is that professionals in California have simply 
had more experience in doing liquidations of high-tech firms because of 
the concentration of failed high-tech firms there in recent years.73 As 
 
 
 72. Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003). 
 73. See Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) (“It may be just that it 
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Figure 3 illustrates, for example, more than 40% of my data set is from 
California, almost twice as much as the next three largest States combined. 
It should be no surprise that the experience would have taught them 
something professionals in other areas have not yet learned. The most 
telling evidence in support of that claim is the general view that even in 
California—where the formal legal system has not changed in any 
apparently relevant way in recent years—ABCs are much more common 
than they used to be.74 As one attorney put it: “[I]f you go back ten years 
here in California there weren’t nearly as many ABCs as there are now. 
. . . I think people just started noticing that that was another way to do 
things.”75 That discussion would suggest that I would obtain a better fit 
with a geographic variable that included only northern California, using a 
location variable that is smaller than the CA variable to reflect the 12% of 
the population based in southern California.76
Other interviews suggested that the effect rested on important 
differences in the legal rules that govern ABCs in California. Those 
interview subjects started by pointing out that the ABC process in 
California historically originated in southern California, in the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area, and became common in Silicon Valley only in 
recent years.77 More affirmatively, the professionals emphasized that 
ABCs in California can be accomplished under a common-law process 
that does not involve any judicial filing of any kind at all.78 This allows the 
process to move rapidly and at relatively low cost. Other states, by 
contrast, often require judicial filings and other onerous conditions that 
make the process less practical.79 This explanation would suggest that I 
would get the best fit with the model discussed above, using a geographic 
variable that distinguished between California and the rest of the 
population. 
may be a practice that is historically due to the size of the economy out here, that people historically 
didn’t realize it’s an option and it’s a less expensive option. That may be part of it. It just may be that 
it’s more popular out here than elsewhere because you just have more companies.”). 
 74. See Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004). 
 75. Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003). 
 76. That hypothesis resonates, of course, with the research of Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook on 
the effect of local legal culture on the consumer choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
filings. See Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the 
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994). 
 77. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 78. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). 
 79. See id. 
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Complicating matters still further, several interview subjects80 
suggested that bankruptcy filings for high-tech firms are particularly 
difficult in the Ninth Circuit because of the decision in In re Catapult 
Entertainment, Inc.81 That case generally held that the debtor-in-
possession in a bankruptcy proceeding cannot assume a nonexclusive 
patent license held by the debtor before bankruptcy, even if the debtor has 
no plans to assign the license to a third party.82 Given the likelihood that 
the businesses of high-tech startups will depend in part on nonexclusive 
licenses of intellectual property, Catapult is a major hindrance to the 
operation of a high-tech business in bankruptcy in the Ninth Circuit. If the 
federal legal system caused the distinction, I should find a better fit with a 
model that stopped at the boundaries of the Ninth Circuit, picking up, in 
addition to California, the 6% of the firms in Oregon, Washington, 
Hawaii, Idaho, and Arizona.83
I investigated those explanations in two different ways. First, I ran 
models that altered the boundary of the portion of the data set in which 
bankruptcies are depressed. Thus, I used a model that replaced the 
California variable described above with a variable that differentiated 
between northern California and the rest of the data set (“NO CAL”). As 
the table below suggests, the results generally were similar to the results in 
Table 2 (which used the CA variable). The influence of the NO CAL 
variable is slightly less than the influence of the California variable: the 
odds ratio is closer to 1 (.467 for NO CAL versus .447 for CA) and the 
degree of significance is less (.002 for NO CAL versus .000 for CA). A 
goodness-of-fit test indicated that the NO CAL variable made a significant 
 80. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second 
Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003). 
 81. In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 82. Id. at 749–55 (rejecting a contrary decision of the First Circuit). Catapult is similar to rules 
adopted by the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits. See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 262 (4th 
Cir. 2004); see also Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com, Identifying, Securing and 
Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 255, 288–93 (2000). Interview subjects believe that the rule in Catapult (and cases like it) makes 
bankruptcy systematically unattractive to software firms. Telephone Interview with Second California 
Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 83. Because the Catapult rule is the law in other jurisdictions, this line is not perfect. Thus, even 
if Catapult were one of the dominating factors, my regressions might not show a substantial effect 
based on the Ninth Circuit boundary. It does appear, however, that the Catapult rule is not the law in 
the other major jurisdictions in my data set, including the First Circuit (which has a contrary rule), and 
the Second and Fifth Circuits (which seem not to have addressed the question). See supra note 82 
(discussing decisions of other circuits). 
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improvement over a model without a location variable, but the fit was not 
as good as with the CA variable. 
Table 3: Northern California and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.417 
(0.225) 
0.659 
PAT  0.006 
(0.248) 
1.006 
BIOPHARM  0.935* 
(0.433) 
2.547 
COMM  0.377 
(0.222) 
1.458 
SMLEMP -1.40*** 
(0.336) 
0.246 
MEDEMP -0.81*** 
(0.253) 
0.444 
SMLAM -0.482 
(0.353) 
0.618 
MEDAM -0.172 
(0.250) 
0.842 
NOCAL -0.76** 
(0.240) 
0.467 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
 
Still, the differences are slight and might be caused by the slightly 
smaller number of NO CAL cases than CA cases. Moreover, even if the 
statistical findings were robust, those findings standing alone would not 
justify rejection of the cultural hypothesis, because there is some support 
in the interviews for the notion that the relevant culture is one that fills the 
entire state of California, having started in southern California and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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migrated recently to northern California.84 Accordingly, I investigated the 
matter further. 
Parallel to the model in Table 3, I ran a model that used a geographic 
variable of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“CA9”) to investigate the 
possibility that federal law rather than state law was driving the 
differential filing rates. Again, the location variable in that model was 
highly significant, but not as influential as either the NO CAL or CA 
variables. Similarly, a goodness-of-fit test indicated that the CA9 variable 
made a significant improvement over a model without a location variable, 
but the fit was not as good as with the CA or NO CAL variables.  
Table 4: CA9 and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.395 
(0.230) 
0.674 
PAT  0.042 
(0.247) 
1.042 
BIOPHARM  0.896* 
(0.433) 
2.449 
COMM  0.378 
(0.221) 
1.459 
SMLEMP -1.34*** 
(0.335) 
0.261 
MEDEMP -0.77*** 
(0.253) 
0.463 
SMLAM -0.495 
(0.354) 
0.610 
MEDAM -0.162 
(0.249) 
0.850 
CA9 -0.580** 
(0.206) 
0.560 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
 
 
 84. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
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To investigate the relative importance of law and culture further, I ran 
separate models that used the three largest states in the population after 
California: Massachusetts, New York, and Texas. The idea was that by 
examining legal systems for ABCs outside California, I might be able to 
determine whether the relative hostility of the legal system to ABCs 
related to the rate of bankruptcy filings. Accordingly, as a first step in that 
analysis, I examined the legal systems in those three states. In general, the 
New York and Texas systems seem most hostile to ABCs, while the 
Massachusetts statute seems to fall in between the most receptive system 
in California and the least receptive systems in New York and Texas. 
The basic criterion for evaluating the non-California statutes was the 
extent of judicial involvement. As discussed above, the basic argument 
presented in the interviews was that states that require a judicial process 
lose the benefits of an ABC both because of the delays in obtaining 
approvals and because of the costs of complying with the process.85 That 
argument ties directly to the point above about the importance of avoiding 
the costs of the Chapter 7 process. Discussing the states that use a judicial 
process, an attorney who represents the largest assignee in California 
explained, “[ABCs are] just not used because there’s no real benefit 
compared to just filing bankruptcy.”86
Using that perspective, the Massachusetts statute seems to be the most 
moderate of the three non-California statutes. It does not require any form 
of judicial approval. The most onerous requirement seems to be that the 
assignee obtain written consent to the assignment from a majority of the 
creditors “in number and value.”87 In contrast to discussions of New York 
and Texas in the interviews, the most serious complaints about the 
Massachusetts system were that its law is not as clearly developed as 
California’s.88 So, for example, a common complaint in interviews with 
Massachusetts professionals was that turnaround professionals there, in the 
absence of statutory support for their actions, feel compelled to give notice 
to creditors and wait as long as a local bankruptcy court typically would 
wait (several weeks) before completing a sale of the assets of a failed 
firm.89 In contrast, knowledgeable attorneys expect that a bankruptcy sale 
in Massachusetts in fact could be accomplished more expeditiously 
 85. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). 
 86. Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003). 
 87. MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 203 § 41 (Law. Co-op. 1981). 
 88. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). 
 89. Massachusetts Professional Interview (transcript on file with author). 
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because of the possibility of an order from the judge expediting the 
standard notice period.90
The most serious problem Massachusetts professionals identify, 
however, is a general lack of confidence in the system, based on past 
experiences in which assignees have cooperated with the executives of 
failed firms to engage in collusive transactions that disadvantaged 
creditors.91 Thus, although several of my interview subjects stated that 
assignments are used on occasion in Massachusetts, and perhaps even with 
increasing frequency,92 they do seem to be viewed with great hostility by 
creditors, particularly secured creditors.93 As a result, they do not appear to 
be effective in the high-tech transactions for which they are used in 
California, in which all parties can agree that an immediate transfer to a 
third party is the best course of action for keeping the technology together 
with the employees necessary to operate it.94 On that point, it is easy to 
speculate that the highly localized venture-capital community in Silicon 
Valley more easily might develop reputation-based norms of cooperation 
than the more dispersed venture-capital community in Massachusetts (to 
say nothing of the highly dispersed venture-capital community in Texas). 
The next most onerous legal system appears to be the system in Texas. 
Although the Texas statute does not require judicial supervision of the 
entire process, it does require the assignee to file a final report with the 
court, and the court must approve the report and make the final 
distribution.95 A California attorney familiar with the Texas experience 
doubted that professionals in Texas often would take advantage of that 
process.96 My direct examination of filing records in Texas found no 
filings for the approximately 50 Texas firms in the data set; similarly, the 
results from interviews consistently indicate that ABCs are quite rare. 
Attorneys, for example, may have heard of them as something that 
happens occasionally, but direct experience is quite uncommon.97 A major 
technology lender to whom I spoke98 had never seen an ABC in his 
 90. Id. 
 91. The basic transaction seems to have been one in which the firm would make an assignment to 
an unduly cooperative assignee, which immediately would sell the assets to a firm controlled by an 
executive of the failed firm, making it difficult for creditors to locate the assets of the failed firm.  
 92. Massachusetts Professional Interview (transcript on file with author). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 23.23 (Vernon 2002). 
 96. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003). 
 97. See Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003). 
 98. He was a lender in two of the eight Western District of Texas bankruptcies in the data set. 
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lending portfolio in Texas.99 The perspective of one experienced attorney 
in Texas100 is that it would be easier to have the failing company file under 
Chapter 7 and have the business purchased from a trustee than it would be 
to do this through an assignee.101 Furthermore, the same attorney indicated 
that she thought that a bankruptcy would provide much better closure for 
outgoing officers than an ABC.102 As discussed above, California 
turnaround professionals strongly disagree with that assessment. 
She did echo, however, the typical California perspective in one regard 
by emphasizing how poorly bankruptcy works for a failing high-tech 
company. First, she emphasized that Chapter 7 was a poor fit for a 
company with valuable technology assets because that technology needs to 
be “kept with the engineers who developed it” and “packaged with the 
specialized research equipment.”103 Because everybody would be laid off 
immediately in a Chapter 7, she suggested that an auction works better in 
that situation.104 Similarly, her view was that a Chapter 11 generally would 
not be a useful option unless the company had sufficient resources to 
survive for about six months,105 which seems unlikely for most of the 
smaller high-tech companies likely to go through ABCs in California. 
Those interviews standing alone, of course, cannot separate the effect 
of the legal system from the cultural hypothesis discussed above. For 
example, the skepticism about the utility of ABCs may rest, at least in 
part, on a lack of familiarity. This may pass as Texas lawyers gain 
experience in dealing with distressed high-technology firms. One 
interesting anecdote did provide considerable support for the view that the 
reluctance to use ABCs in Texas, at least, is not entirely cultural. One of 
the California attorneys that I interviewed was a member of a firm that has 
an office in Austin. He described a recent transaction in which the firm 
and the assignee expended considerable effort attempting to use Delaware 
law to govern an assignment of a firm in Texas. These were parties 
familiar with the process and highly motivated to use it, but quite 
dissatisfied with the process available under Texas law. Ultimately, the 
parties decided to use an assignment under Texas law, but the cost and 
 99. See Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2003). 
 100. That attorney represented the debtor in two of the four Western District of Texas Chapter 11s 
in my data set. 
 101. See Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003). 
 102. See id.; Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2003). 
 103. Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. As Figure 7 suggests, the six month figure seems optimistic for the firms in our data 
set. 
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delay was much more than they had been accustomed to based on their 
experience in California.106
Turning finally to the New York statute, it seems plain that this is the 
most onerous of the statutes that I examined.107 Under the New York 
statute, for example, a court generally administers the estate of the 
assignor, determining such things as which claims are permissible, 
whether the business can be operated while in the control of the assignee, 
and whether actions should be brought to recover preferences.108 Most 
importantly, the assignee cannot sell assets at a private sale without 
advance judicial authorization.109 Generally, courts view the process as 
bringing the entire business in custodia legis.110
Based on that information, I ran three separate models using in 
sequence, MAS, TX, and NY as geographic variables. If legal systems 
were the only factor driving the results, the expectation would be that 
MAS would be weakly significant if at all, TX would have a positive 
influence on bankruptcy filings, and NY would have the strongest positive 
influence on bankruptcy filings. The regressions provide little support for 
that framework: MAS is not significant, TX is highly significant, but NY 
is not significant. Goodness-of-fit tests show no significant improvement 
from use of MAS and NY over a model without a location variable; the 
TX variable showed an improvement only in some of the runs. On the 
other hand, the small number of cases for those states suggests that little 
weight should be put on the limited significance revealed by the data 
analysis. 
 106. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003). The anecdotal 
evidence of that transaction is not inconsistent with my statement above that I found no Texas ABCs, 
as the firm in question was not a firm in my data set. 
 107. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003). 
 108. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 15 (Consol. 2004). 
 109. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 19 (Consol. 2004). 
 110. See City of New York v. U.S., 283 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1960); Florence Trading Corp. v. 
Rosenberg, 128 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1942). 
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Table 5: Massachusetts and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.58** 
(0.223) 
0.560 
PAT -0.066 
(0.246) 
0.936 
BIOPHARM  0.992* 
(0.433) 
2.697 
COMM  0.365 
(0.219) 
1.440 
SMLEMP -1.39*** 
(0.337) 
0.250 
MEDEMP -0.84*** 
(0.251) 
0.432 
SMLAM -0.462 
(0.351) 
0.630 
MEDAM -0.166 
(0.247) 
0.847 
MAS -0.193 
(0.335) 
0.825 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
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Table 6: Texas and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.68** 
(0.219) 
0.506 
PAT -0.083 
(0.245) 
0.920 
BIOPHARM  1.052* 
(0.432) 
2.864 
COMM  0.373 
(0.220) 
1.453 
SMLEMP -1.37*** 
(0.335) 
0.254 
MEDEMP -0.78** 
(0.252) 
0.460 
SMLAM -0.522 
(0.354) 
0.593 
MEDAM -0.174 
(0.248) 
0.840 
TX  0.794* 
(0.346) 
2.212 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
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Table 7: New York and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.63** 
(0.218) 
0.530 
PAT -0.040 
(0.244) 
0.960 
BIOPHARM  0.956* 
(0.429) 
2.601 
COMM  0.378 
(0.219) 
1.459 
SMLEMP -1.38*** 
(0.335) 
0.253 
MEDEMP -0.82*** 
(0.250) 
0.439 
SMLAM -0.461 
(0.352) 
0.631 
MEDAM -0.163 
(0.247) 
0.850 
NY  0.286 
(0.428) 
1.331 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=635 
 
In the end, the data analysis is not sufficiently clear to justify a view 
that attributes the pattern of filing entirely to law or culture. Thus, I find 
the most plausible explanation to be that the pattern is a combination of 
both law and culture: firms often avoid ABCs in states that do not have a 
legal system that is hospitable to those filings, but even if the legal system 
is hospitable, there is a considerable learning curve that makes those 
filings less customary in locations where the relevant professionals have 
less experience dealing with failed venture investments. 
b. Location and Type of Bankruptcy Filing 
The next question I tried to investigate was the relation between 
location and the type of bankruptcy filing. The purpose of this inquiry was 
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to understand in which types of cases the ABC process might be preferred 
to bankruptcies. The interviews suggested two conflicting hypotheses. 
First, firms that are small in the sense of having too few liquid assets 
would not use an ABC process because of the substantial minimum fee 
that a major ABC firm takes for doing the assignment.111 Second, firms 
that are more complex do not use an ABC process because it cannot be 
used to sustain an operating business for a substantial period.112 Generally, 
some interview subjects suggested that ABCs should be a substitute for 
Chapter 7 filings except in relatively small cases, and should not be a 
substitute for Chapter 11 filings.113 Because all of the firms were venture-
backed and thus (at least at one point in time) had substantial assets, I 
doubted that many of them would have been too small at the time of 
failure for an ABC. Accordingly, I approached the data with the 
hypothesis that ABCs were a substitute for Chapter 7 filings, but not for 
Chapter 11 filings. 
The data supported that hypothesis with respect to Chapter 7. First, to 
test the relation between location and Chapter 7 filings, I ran a logistic 
regression using the same variables as above, but compared firms that did 
not file for bankruptcy with firms that filed for Chapter 7. As the table 
below illustrates, location in California was highly significant, with a 
negative coefficient and low odds ratio, indicating a lower likelihood of 
Chapter 7 filings.114  
 111. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id.; Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003). 
 114. A similar regression, which I do not report here, produced similar but less significant results 
from a comparison of firms that filed for Chapter 7 to those firms that did not. Two parallel regressions 
using NO CAL instead of CA also produced similar results with a lower degree of significance for the 
location variable. 
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Table 8: California and Chapter 7 Filings 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -0.83** 
(0.272) 
0.434 
PAT -0.040 
(0.313) 
0.960 
BIOPHARM  0.920 
(0.482) 
2.510 
COMM -0.271 
(0.294) 
0.763 
SMLEMP -1.00* 
(0.394) 
0.367 
MEDEMP -0.623* 
(0.324) 
0.536 
SMLAM -0.476 
(0.419) 
0.621 
MEDAM -0.05 
(0.316) 
0.951 
CA -0.77** 
(0.268) 
0.461 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=572 
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Table 9: Texas and Chapter 7 Filings 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant  1.15*** 
(0.266) 
0.317 
PAT -0.166 
(0.313) 
0.847 
BIOPHARM  1.033* 
(0.482) 
2.810 
COMM -0.293 
(0.293) 
0.746 
SMLEMP -0.969* 
(0.394) 
0.379 
MEDEMP -0.605 
(0.321) 
0.546 
SMLAM -0.531 
(0.420) 
0.588 
MEDAM -0.095 
(0.310) 
0.910 
TX  0.830* 
(0.406) 
2.292 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=572 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1375 Mann book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1375 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, as you would expect from the data reported above, the data 
from Texas show a similar degree of significance, but in this case the 
positive coefficient and elevated odds ratio indicates a greater likelihood 
of Chapter 7 filings.115
The data related to Chapter 11, however, did not support the hypothesis 
that location would not affect Chapter 11 filings. As it happens, the effect 
on Chapter 11 filings is about the same as the effect on Chapter 7 filings. 
The tables below illustrate those results for California (where Chapter 11 
filings are depressed even more strongly than Chapter 7 filings)116 and 
Texas (where Chapter 11 filings are elevated).117 The Texas findings do 
fall short of statistical significance, but the positive coefficient and 
elevated odds ratio is consistent with the other findings. 
 115. A similar regression, which I do not report here, produced similar but less significant results 
from a comparison of firms that filed for Chapter 7 to those firms that did not. Parallel regressions with 
respect to Massachusetts were inconclusive, much like the Massachusetts model reported above. 
 116. See supra note 114. 
 117. See supra note 115. 
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Table 10: California and Chapter 11 Filings 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -1.47*** 
(0.336) 
0.230 
PAT  0.175 
(0.345) 
1.191 
BIOPHARM  1.128 
(0.740) 
3.088 
COMM  1.32*** 
(0.326) 
3.734 
SMLEMP -2.38*** 
(0.658) 
0.093 
MEDEMP -1.09** 
(0.368) 
0.337 
SMLAM -0.376 
(0.628) 
0.687 
MEDAM -0.284 
(0.358) 
0.753 
CA -0.956** 
(0.319) 
0.384 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=553 
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Table 11: Texas and Chapter 11 Filings 
 
Coeff Odds Ratio 
Constant -1.83*** 
(0.330) 
0.160 
PAT  0.021 
(0.337) 
1.021 
BIOPHARM  1.142 
(0.731) 
3.133 
COMM  1.24*** 
(0.321) 
3.461 
SMLEMP -2.29*** 
(0.646) 
0.101 
MEDEMP -1.02** 
(0.364) 
0.359 
SMLAM -0.420 
(0.621) 
0.657 
MEDAM -0.286 
(0.351) 
0.751 
TX  0.642 
(0.506) 
1.899 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 N=553 
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Thus, the data suggest that something in California—and the use of 
ABCs certainly seems to be the most obvious answer—is removing a 
portion of filings from both the Chapter 7 and the Chapter 11 docket.118 
My intuition is that this reflects the fact that the distinction between a 
Chapter 7 filing and a Chapter 11 filing in practice is not as stark as the 
data suggest. On reflection, this seems to make sense given the nature of 
the data set. For one thing, because all of the firms are relatively small, the 
need for Chapter 11 based on size and complexity alone is relatively 
uncommon. Thus, within the data set, the use of Chapter 11 often is a 
liquidation device much like Chapter 7.119 Many of the Chapter 11 filings 
either involve sales of property under Section 363120 or liquidating 
plans.121 For another, to the extent that the assignee is important because 
of the assignee’s ability to keep the employees attached to the business 
long enough to sell it,122 the ABC procedure operates as a low-cost 
privately ordered reorganization. From that perspective, it should provide 
a method for simple sales of businesses that would be too small to bear the 
 118. I also tried to separate a set of “successful” Chapter 11s to see if the relation would hold 
against that set. I had some difficulty in defining success for this set of Chapter 11s, all of which were 
filed since 2001 and many of which are ongoing. See 1 NAT’L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM’N, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 611 (1997) (discussing difficulty in defining success). I 
settled on excluding clearly unsuccessful bankruptcies, and I included the bankruptcies for which a 
plan was proposed that has been confirmed or is still pending (39 of 68 Chapter 11s). The model 
showed no significant influence for the location variable. Given the small numbers with which I was 
working (39), however, I ultimately decided that the line of inquiry was not probative. 
 119. This finding is consistent with the findings in Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 3. 
 120. Sales of property under Section 363 is a possibility discussed in the interviews as a way in 
which an assignment might be a substitute for a Chapter 11 proceeding. See Telephone Interview with 
Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003). 
 121. It is plain that all involved would prefer a sale of the business under Section 363 rather than a 
liquidating plan, largely because of the transaction costs of complying with the procedures for 
approval of a plan. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). The 
decision of the Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp. (Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel 
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983), suggested that such sales might be appropriate in relatively 
narrow circumstances if a substantial justification is apparent. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066–72. 
In recent years, however, practice seems to have allowed the Lionel exception almost to swallow the 
rule, so that Section 363 sales of the entire business have become quite common; most courts will not 
insist on full adoption of a liquidating plan. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney 
(Mar. 30, 2004); Email from Second California Attorney (Mar. 29, 2004). Interestingly, many of the 
firms that conduct Section 363 sales nevertheless file and confirm plans of reorganization, instead of 
converting the cases to Chapter 7 and liquidating under that Chapter. In my data set, for example, 
Chapter 11 plans followed Section 363 sales in at least ten cases (Sphera Optical Networks, Phylos, 
Flashcom, BroadBand Office, InternetConnect, Digital BroadBand, Cambrian Communications, 
Onsite Access, Protarga, PointOne Telecommunications). There appear to be only three cases of 
Section 363 sales followed by a conversion to Chapter 7 (Nanovation, Fastech, HydraWeb 
Technologies). 
 122. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
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costs of a Chapter 11 proceeding.123 Thus, in the end, there may be little 
substantive distinction between the use of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7, at 
least with respect to the value of the ABC procedure as a substitute. I 
explore the implications of those findings in the next part of the Article. 
c. Size and Bankruptcy Filing 
The final topic I examined was the relation between size and Chapter 
filings. As discussed above, the interviews and the bankruptcy filing data 
suggest that ABC filings are siphoning off the smaller firms from each 
Chapter.124 The interviews generally suggested that the California-style 
ABC works better for firms that have smaller and simpler affairs, both 
because of the lower likelihood of complex disagreements among 
stakeholders and because of the lower likelihood of important preference 
litigation. For Chapter 11 filings, the interviews strongly suggested that 
only larger firms could bear the substantial costs of those proceedings.125 
To the extent the data above indicate that there is little distinction between 
the two Chapters, the regressions should show similar size effects for both 
Chapters. 
That in fact is the case. As discussed briefly above, I collected two 
different proxies for size: employees and amount financed. In each case, I 
divided the firms into three sectors (small, medium, and large employees 
and amounts raised). In each of the tables reported above, SMLEMP is 
statistically significant, with a coefficient and odds ratio indicating that 
bankruptcy filings are less common than for the remainder of the data set. 
MEDEMP is occasionally significant, though always with less influence 
than SMLEMP. Finally, the variables for amounts generally are not 
significant, suggesting that the number of employees is a better proxy for 
the terminal size of the firm than the total amount raised.126
 123. See Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) (suggesting that it 
would not be plausible to use a Chapter 11 for a business that would have assets worth less than $15 
million). 
 124. That assumes, as I suggested above, that none of my firms are too small for a California-style 
ABC. 
 125. See supra note 123. 
 126. That makes some sense given the way that the variables are collected. The number for 
employees reflects the number of employees as of the last time that VentureOne collected a report 
from the firm, generally some time in the last quarter of the firm’s operations. That is probably a better 
proxy for size and complexity as of the firm’s failure than the total amount raised during the firm’s 
lifetime. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
The data described above seem to me interesting and informative in 
their own right. They also, however, have some obvious implications for 
bankruptcy policy. Specifically, the data directly raise the question 
whether other states should adopt a process similar to the California-style 
ABC described above. More generally, because the data provide some 
information on the reasons that firms choose bankruptcy from the 
available liquidation options, they shed light both on the various bodies of 
literature that have articulated views about the role that the bankruptcy 
process plays in dealing with the failure of firms in our economy, and on 
potential improvements of that process. 
A. Alternatives to Bankruptcy 
The most interesting possibility that the data suggest is that the costs of 
financial distress could be lowered if states adopted legal systems that 
were as hospitable to the ABC process as the California system. The line 
of argument is simple enough. The premise is that the ABC process 
dominates in California because it provides a cheaper and more effective 
method of dealing with a significant class of failed firms. If that is true, 
then other states that adopt similar statutes could produce better results in 
their own states: lowering the number of corporate bankruptcies, 
increasing the recoveries for creditors of failed firms, and increasing the 
speed with which assets and employees of failed firms are redirected to 
productive use.127 Two concerns with that premise are apparent, both of 
which warrant further investigation, but neither of which strikes me as 
dispositive: protecting nonconsenting creditors and secrecy. 
1. Nonconsenting Creditors 
The most obvious concern is that the ABC process would harm 
nonconsenting creditors. Although more information would be useful, my 
current view is to doubt that the problem is significant, at least as things 
currently operate in California. For one thing, it seems likely that any 
substantial group of creditors harmed by the process could overturn the 
results by filing an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. The easy case is 
 127. The California statutes are by no means unique. See BERMAN, supra note 40. As discussed 
above, however, none of the other states with major concentrations of high-technology businesses have 
legal systems that are similarly receptive to ABCs. 
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secured creditors; interview subjects uniformly recognize that the consent 
of secured creditors is a prerequisite to a successful ABC, indeed that the 
secured creditors typically control the process in those cases in which 
there are not enough assets to repay the secured creditors easily.128 As 
discussed below, however, the particular nature of these firms makes it 
relatively unlikely that the secured creditors ordinarily are directly 
responsible for the decision to put the firm through an ABC.129
The position of unsecured creditors is harder to evaluate. Those who 
conduct ABCs say that unsecured creditors have the practical ability to 
disrupt an ABC, at least if it does not proceed in a way that advances their 
interests.130 The apparent idea is that any substantial group of mistreated 
creditors could file an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding and force the 
assignee to turn the assets of the failed firm over to the bankruptcy court. 
At least in California, however, there is some reason to believe that 
bankruptcy judges are not inclined to disrupt ABCs. Thus, at least from 
the perspective of turnaround professionals, it is commonplace for 
bankruptcy judges faced with a bankruptcy that is filed in response to a 
well-administered ABC to abstain and dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding 
under Bankruptcy Code § 305.131 That understanding seems plausible: the 
relevant statute directs courts to consider whether “the interests of 
creditors and the debtor would be better served by . . . dismissal,”132 which 
 128. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview 
with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003); Telephone Interview with Fourth California 
Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 
2003). One California attorney explained to me that secured creditors often prefer an ABC to a 
foreclosure because the assignee is likely to produce more value than the secured creditor’s own 
personnel. That is true, he explained, both because of the greater ease with which the assignee can 
package assets with the relevant personnel, and because of the experience of the assignee in locating 
and dealing with buyers for technology-related assets. See Telephone Interview with Second California 
Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004). A lender emphasized the difficulties lenders face in selling those assets 
because of the reluctance of institutional lenders to make the requisite representations and warranties. 
See Telephone Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2004); Telephone Interview with Third 
California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003). Although it is not clear that the distinction is entirely rational, 
purchasers in ABC transactions apparently are more willing to forego reliable assurances of that 
nature. 
 129. See infra text accompanying notes 178–86. 
 130. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). 
 131. See Kupetz, supra note 40, at 75–78; Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround 
Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003) (discussing two such cases dismissed under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 305); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (describing “[m]any, 
many, many” of those cases involving his firm and stating that he could not remember an involuntary 
bankruptcy filed against one of his firm’s assignments that was not dismissed). 
 132. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2000). Courts are emboldened by legislative history indicating that 
abstention is appropriate when “an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and debtors out of 
court, there is no prejudice to the rights of creditors in that arrangement, and an involuntary case has 
been commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for future threats to extract full 
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a court readily could determine to be the case when a competent assignee 
is involved. 
Finding objective support for that thesis, however, is more difficult. 
Reported decisions in such cases are scant—and there are not any from 
California. That is not to say, however, that the issue does not arise with 
some frequency. As indicated below, even this small data set indicates that 
bankruptcy judges plainly do not write opinions in each case where this 
problem arises. At least one of the interviews suggested a less favorable 
view of ABCs: one California attorney explained that in his view 
California bankruptcy judges in fact are hostile to ABCs and keep cases 
whenever there is any substantial claim that would warrant use of the 
bankruptcy process, such as preferences that need to be pursued (a topic I 
discuss in more detail below).133 Even that explanation, however, involves 
a willingness to intervene only to expedite litigation involving the debtor 
(a subject also discussed below), not a willingness to intervene to second-
guess business and liquidation decisions of the assignee. The same subject 
went on to suggest that courts are particularly unlikely to write opinions 
when they deny motions to dismiss. To the extent those comments reflect 
a consistent pattern, it is plausible to think that the opinion-reporting 
process rather than unanimity in decided cases caused my difficulty in 
finding any such opinions.134 Still, it is plain that a number of courts have 
abstained in those circumstances.135 I have not located any reported 
opinion rejecting a motion to dismiss that is filed by an assignee in an 
ABC. Moreover, interviews with three experienced California bankruptcy 
judges—none of whom had ever seen a case in which an assignee sought 
such a ruling—strongly suggest that turnaround professionals overestimate 
the extent to which bankruptcy judges have a decided views about the 
process. 
It happens—perhaps fortuitously, given what I was told in interviews 
with judges—that one of the California bankruptcies in the data set 
involves that scenario. Four creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 
proceeding against Pluris, Inc. in August of 2002.136 Previously, the firm 
had made a voluntary assignment under an ABC procedure to Sherwood 
payment.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 325 (1977) (quoted in In re Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003)). 
 133. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., In re Bailey’s Beauticians Supply Co., 671 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1982); In re 
Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); In re Artists’ Outlet, Inc., 25 B.R. 231 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re M. Egan Co., 24 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 136. This information is from the bankruptcy court’s docket sheet. 
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Partners, Inc., a prominent California firm that often serves as an 
assignee.137 In September of 2002, Sherwood Partners, Inc. filed a motion 
seeking abstention and dismissal. After a November 2002 hearing, the 
motion was granted on January 3, 2003, resulting in dismissal of the 
bankruptcy. The court explained that the bankruptcy proceeding 
apparently had been filed by a creditor that sought to take control of the 
debtor in Chapter 11 to gain access to the tax attributes of the failed entity. 
The court also expressed skepticism about the viability of the creditor’s 
proposed Chapter 11 plan, as well as the concern that a Chapter 11 
proceeding would involve wasted expenses that in the end would not 
benefit creditors.138
Without more information, it is difficult to assess the role that 
bankruptcy courts play in protecting minority creditors in ABCs. On the 
one hand, reluctance of bankruptcy judges to intervene could result in an 
ABC process that is harmful to creditors by leaving no practical 
mechanism by which unsecured creditors can use the bankruptcy process 
to protect themselves. Conversely, it could be viewed as yet another 
empirical data point indicating that the ABC process is producing such a 
clearly positive return for creditors as a group that bankruptcy judges are 
reluctant to intervene. Of course, even if judges are declining to intervene 
on the theory that intervention would not aid creditors (the position of the 
judge in Pluris), that does not prove that the system is working optimally. 
It is possible, of course, that creditors would have gotten a better outcome 
had the firm initially filed for bankruptcy, but a bankruptcy that comes 
after much of the liquidation has been conducted by the assignee can only 
make matters worse. I obviously do not have enough evidence to take a 
conclusive view on that point. 
My intuition, however, is that the more benign understanding is better. 
After all, bankruptcy judges have no good reason to abstain if they think 
the process is harming creditors. Whatever Section 305 means, it is 
difficult to say that it requires a judge to abstain in deference to an ABC 
that the judge views as harmful.139 Even the interview subject discussed 
above suggested only that bankruptcy judges would retain the cases if 
there was a substantial need for the bankruptcy process, not that 
 137. See Goncharoff, supra note 60. For information on Sherwood, see http://www.shrwood.com 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 138. Copies of the relevant portions of the file are on file with the author. 
 139. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney Interview (Mar. 30, 2004) 
(suggesting that bankruptcy courts would be receptive in cases in which creditors have a “real 
grievance”). 
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bankruptcy judges would overturn ABCs simply because a creditor asked 
them to.140 That understanding resonates with my discussion below, which 
contends that the ABC process in California has evolved to serve the cases 
where bankruptcy has no useful role, and that bankruptcy continues to be 
used in the substantial set of cases where it has functional value. 
It is particularly important in assessing California-style ABCs to notice 
that the statute directly protects the principal creditors that would receive 
priority payments in a bankruptcy proceeding. The California statute 
includes provisions, modeled on Bankruptcy Code § 502(b), that require 
assignees to make payments to priority creditors much like a trustee in 
bankruptcy.141 It is not clear how effective those are in practice, and it is 
clear that the list of priorities is much shorter than in the federal 
Bankruptcy Code,142 but their existence provides some assurance for those 
creditors. 
More directly, aside from the ability of creditors to use the bankruptcy 
process to overturn the results of ABCs, the actions of assignees are 
policed by the behavior of creditors dissatisfied with the process. 
Doubtless the most important possibility is that assignees that do not 
perform well will lose business. The market in California is highly 
concentrated, the relevant players (entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and 
lenders) are all likely to be repeat players, and a failure to perform well is 
likely to be quite evident to all. Thus, there is some reason to believe that 
reputational constraints will have a substantial effect on assignees. Thus, 
even in California it is clear that some creditors have a decidedly negative 
view of the ABC process and that they tolerate ABCs only where they 
have confidence that the assignee will protect their interests actively.143 
For some assignees (like CMA—the California affiliate of the National 
Association of Credit Managers), that is feasible because of a long 
tradition as a creditor representative. For others, that is accomplished 
through close relational ties to the community of venture investors and 
lenders. The Massachusetts interviews show how important those 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (discussing 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1204–1204.5) (West 1982 & Supp. 2005)). 
 142. The priorities under California law are limited to employees, pension creditors, and certain 
tax payments. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1204–1204.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). Thus, the 
possibility that creditors that would receive priority payments in bankruptcy will receive nothing in an 
ABC is at least plausible. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004). 
Given the frequency with which priority creditors go unpaid in bankruptcy, however, it is not clear that 
this should be a major concern. I note that none of my Chapter 11 schedules indicated priority claims 
that predated bankruptcy for anything other than wages, pension contributions, and taxes. 
 143. See Telephone Interview with Fifth California Attorney (Jan. 7, 2005). 
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constraints are to a functioning system: in the more dispersed community 
there, the actions of what seem to have been a few unreliable assignees 
apparently have poisoned the community in general against the assignment 
as a routine vehicle for rapid disposition of high-tech firms.144
Most conventionally, there is, of course, the possibility that disaffected 
creditors will sue an assignee for failure to perform adequately. 
Surprisingly enough, the legal standard that would govern such an action 
is unclear. One lawyer opined to me that the duty of the assignee is a 
straightforward contractual obligation formed in the contract with the 
assignor.145 It seems to me likely, however, that a court faced with 
substantial claims of misconduct would conclude that an assignee has a 
fiduciary duty to creditors.146 The reason that standard is not clear is 
evident from the discussion above. As one attorney explained, disaffected 
creditors have little incentive to litigate about what the assignee’s standard 
of care is when they have the ready ability to file an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding in which they can overturn the entire assignment 
process if they can establish some substantial need for judicial 
oversight.147  
2. Secrecy 
The second concern relates to the secrecy of the process. Several of the 
interviews suggested that secrecy is a motivating factor for using the ABC 
process. It is not clear how important this is,148 but it is something that 
some people mention as having some import in some cases. The basic 
point is that the process can be accomplished quickly, without a public 
filing, and often without any public notoriety. Indeed, one of the reasons it 
 144. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 145. Email from Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 29, 2004); 
Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30. 2004). 
 146. I rely on the typical statement to the effect that “[i]t is the duty of the assignee in the 
performance of his trust to defend this property against all unjust adverse claims” or that the assignee 
is “trustee for all the creditors.” Credit Managers Ass’n v. Nat’l Independent Bus. Alliance, 162 Cal. 
App. 3d 1166, 1171, 1172 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Mechanics Bank of Richmond v. Rosenberg, 201 
Cal. App. 2d 419, 424 (1962) (describing assignee as holding a “trust for the benefit of creditors”); 
Brainard v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. 2d 157, 163 (1935) (validating general assignment for the benefit of 
creditors because it is “made for the benefit of creditors generally”). 
 147. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004) (suggesting that 
bankruptcy courts would be receptive in cases in which creditors have a “real grievance”). 
 148. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003) (“I don’t think 
notoriety is the driving force on these things. I think it is purely economic.”); Telephone Interview 
with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) (“There’s also sometimes been played up, in some of 
the articles or interviews that I’ve been involved with, the lower level of publicity. But that’s not 
something that I really promote or necessarily think that is really such a big deal.”). 
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is so difficult to collect information about the frequency of ABCs is that 
newspaper reports by uninformed reporters may describe an ABC as a sale 
of the firm without any understanding that it reflects a failure and 
insolvency. The instinct to protect confidentiality is also evidenced by the 
unwillingness of turnaround firms to identify for me the firms for which 
they had done ABCs: they would tell me how many firms in my data set 
had been their customers, but not which ones—even when I already knew 
that the firms had failed. Thus, it is plain that there is some stigma 
associated with the process. 
Absent some specific statutory obligation of publicity, however, it is 
not obvious to me why a process that allows a firm to fail quietly is 
inherently bad. There is, of course, a fine line between improper “secrecy” 
and simply being reticent to publicize an embarrassing event. As one of 
the leading turnaround professionals explained: 
I don’t think it’s done for secrecy. I think it’s done for more public 
relations, concern about future business and the perception of it 
more than anything of bankruptcy. That’s what I get from most 
people. . . . It’s interesting because I don’t like the word, secret. I 
don’t think it’s a real secret. If I have creditors who call and ask me, 
“What’s going on? What was the sale? What happened?” I tell 
them. So from that perspective I don’t look at it as secret because 
creditors have a right to know what’s happening, and when they are 
going to get paid, and what the distribution was.149
The biggest concern is that such a process might have an adverse effect 
on a creditor that did not in fact receive notice. As discussed above,150 
however, it seems unlikely to me that the process would bind such a 
creditor. My impression is that the process works relatively well in this 
context because the businesses are sufficiently young and simple in their 
operations that the likelihood of large unknown creditors is small. My 
interview subjects—admittedly not the most reliable source since they do 
not represent creditors that have not received notice—suggest that the 
problem of omitted creditors is not a major one. For one thing, they think 
that major creditors are highly likely to learn of the process before funds 
are distributed.151 The only major creditors likely to be negligent enough 
to fail to notice the closure of their debtor for the greater part of a year 
appear to be tax creditors, and for various reasons assignees seem to have 
 149. Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004). 
 150. See supra note 42. 
 151. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003). 
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strong reasons to make sure that tax creditors are paid.152 Thus, it surely is 
the case that some creditors, some of the time, will be prejudiced by 
failure to receive notice of an ABC. It does not appear, however, based on 
the limited information I have, to be a major problem in practice. 
A related point is that the use of an ABC instead of a bankruptcy 
allows the officers of the failed firm to avoid the need to make disclosures 
required by securities laws when directors of a failed firm previously have 
filed for bankruptcy.153 If we assume that the rules requiring those 
disclosures reflect a policy choice that it is important to the investment 
markets to know if officers and directors previously have been involved 
with failed companies, then the ability of those officers and directors to 
use this process to avoid that obligation could be problematic. Still, the 
SEC could readily revise its rules to extend them to cover ABCs explicitly 
if it wished to do so. 
In sum, although it is appropriate to be skeptical about a process 
dominated by the debtor and its major creditors, I am not persuaded that 
there is a serious reason for concern about the process in this context. 
Given the obvious cost savings that it produces, it seems to me that it is at 
least worth considering whether it would be beneficial for other states to 
follow California’s lead here. The most difficult problem would be trying 
to avoid the breakdown in trust that has disrupted the use of the procedure 
in Massachusetts. It might be hard, however, to replicate that system in 
contexts that do not share the basic structure of the Silicon Valley high-
tech community: a highly concentrated and interrelated set of actors, 
including boards of failed companies making liquidation choices, 
controlled by venture-capital investors that have repeat-player reasons for 
wanting to ensure that a small group of repeat-player secured creditors are 
treated fairly. I do not intend to resolve these questions here. There are of 
course important bankruptcy policies implicated by a concerted effort by 
states to develop procedures that would shift the liquidation of failed firms 
from a federal forum specifically designed to protect creditors to a state 
process specifically designed to avoid judicial oversight.154 I intend only to 
 152. See supra note 42. 
 153. See Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003); 
Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). The regulation in question 
is Item 401(f)(1) of Regulation S-K, which requires disclosure of involvement in certain bankruptcy 
and insolvency proceedings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f)(1) (2004). Given the general vagueness of 
disclosure requirements in securities laws, it is a bit surprising to me that California lawyers are so 
certain that involvement in ABCs need not be disclosed, but the interviews suggest in practice a bright 
line between the two types of proceedings. 
 154. For a preliminary discussion of the general problem, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
p1375 Mann book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] LIQUIDATION CHOICES OF FAILED HIGH TECH FIRMS 1425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
underscore the possibility that a state process can play a useful role in 
lowering the costs in a substantial part of the overall volume of failed 
firms, and the parallel need to ensure that any such system is designed in a 
way (as the current systems do) that permit creditors to protect themselves 
from the ABC process if it treats them unfairly. 
B. The Role of Bankruptcy 
A substantial part of current bankruptcy literature focuses on what role 
bankruptcy plays in the liquidation and reorganization of failing firms. 
Douglas Baird and Bob Rasmussen, in their work on the “End” and 
“Twilight” of bankruptcy, have underscored a decline in the traditional use 
of Chapter 11 as a venue for negotiating and working out a plan for 
reorganization of a complex business.155 Lynn LoPucki has criticized that 
explanation,156 but even his responses do not seem to undercut the notion 
that Chapter 11’s role in its maturity is quite different from its role in the 
1980s.157 Because so many firms continue to file for Chapter 11, there is 
something of a void in our understanding of exactly why firms file for 
Chapter 11. 
This research contributes to that subject in three ways. First, because it 
provides a rare opportunity to examine a population of failed firms to see 
which of those firms file for bankruptcy, it gives some limited insight into 
why firms choose to file for bankruptcy instead of using one of the other 
options available to them. Second, by shedding some light on the efficacy 
of liquidation and sale of businesses in ABCs and in bankruptcy, this 
research provides limited support for an optimistic view of current practice 
that undermines the calls for high-speed mandatory auctions supported by 
several groups of bankruptcy scholars. Third, by illuminating the problems 
with bankruptcy that cause firms to choose ABCs, it offers some guidance 
about potential avenues for improvement in the bankruptcy process. 
Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 150. 
 155. Baird & Rasmussen, The End, supra note 2; Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 3. 
Baird’s paper with Ed Morrison contributes to that literature as well by suggesting that bankruptcy 
decisionmaking about the optimal stopping of firms is better than might have been thought. Baird & 
Morrison, supra note 3. For an empirical extension of that work, see Morrison, supra note 3. 
 156. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply to Baird and Rasmussen’s The 
End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003). 
 157. David Skeel’s work reflects a similar perspective on the differences in practice as Chapter 11 
has matured. E.g., David A. Skeel, Creditor’s Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in 
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003). 
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It is true, of course, that the data set presents a narrow slice of the 
Chapter 11 universe.158 Still, a data set concentrated on bankruptcies of 
this particular size sheds considerable light on the role of bankruptcy 
because of the unique opportunity to examine how firms of a particular 
sort use bankruptcy. Indeed, the particular features of this data set make it 
useful for examining these questions. Among other things, the data set 
includes a homogenous set of firms all of whom are represented by 
counsel, all of whom have relatively sophisticated equity investors, and 
none of whom face any of the problems unique to public companies.159 By 
removing the distractions of unsophisticated borrowers and creditors and 
the distortions that securities laws impose on firm conduct, the data set 
makes it possible to look exclusively at the value of using the bankruptcy 
process to resolve the various problems of a failing firm. 
1. Summary Data 
I start by providing a few summary statistics about the bankruptcy files 
I have examined to put in context the analysis in the sections that follow. 
The data draws on the schedules from 62 of the Chapter 11 cases in the 
data set.160
Assets: The first question is what assets remained for these firms by the 
time that they filed. The simplest number to report would be the total 
 158. As mentioned above, supra note 3, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook are 
involved in a major project that involves a sample of all Chapter 11s. Their work will provide a much 
better understanding of the universe of Chapter 11 filings. 
 159. For example, one of the interview subjects noted that public firms do not use the ABC 
process because they would have to obtain shareholder approvals that are unnecessary for a 
bankruptcy filing. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). That 
suggests some difficulty in relying on data about the filings of public firms to learn much about the 
functions that the system serves. On that point, the position of an ABC in the gray area between a sale 
of assets and an insolvency proceeding has produced an interesting dynamic. As the interview subjects 
suggest, it commonly is said that you need shareholder approval to accomplish an ABC. Historically, 
though, there is some support for the notion that an assignment can be accomplished without 
shareholder approval. See In re E.T. Russell Co., 291 F. 809 (D. Mass. 1923). Accepting the received 
wisdom from the interviews, however, raises the question of whether it is appropriate for bankruptcy 
to be used for the sole reason of avoiding shareholder approval requirements that would limit the 
ability to use an ABC. It may be that the bankruptcy process in effect serves as a form of shareholder 
approval that resolves any corporate governance concerns. Still, the role of shareholder approval in 
guiding firms into the formal bankruptcy process is troubling. The question of course relates to the 
broader question that is surfacing in recent literature regarding the possibility that managers of an 
insolvent firm owe their duty to creditors rather than to shareholders. See generally Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003). 
 160. There were a total of 66 Chapter 11 cases. Three firms filed no schedules and I was unable to 
obtain the schedules from one of the firms. 
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assets as reported on the schedules. It is clear, however, that different 
firms used different protocols for deciding how to fill out their schedules. 
Many firms, including some with substantial patent portfolios, simply 
attributed no value at all to their intellectual property,161 while others 
attributed substantial value to such assets specifically.162 To give some 
objectivity to the data, I decided to collect both the total amount of assets 
and the tangible assets specifically.163 Table 12 provides summary data on 
those points. Generally, it suggests a substantial asset base for these firms, 
even excluding intangible assets.164
Table 12: Assets of Chapter 11 Firms ($M) 
 Biopharm 
N=3 
Software 
N=17 
Telecom 
N=42 
Aggregate 
N=62 
Tangible 
Assets 
 
Mean 2.1 6.9 29.4 21.9 
Median 2.5 2.3 9.1 4.50 
Standard 
Deviation    
60.3 
 
Total Assets 
 
Mean 2.2 13.8 31.0 24.9 
Median 2.5 4.3 9.7 8.09 
Standard 
Deviation    60.9 
 
Liabilities: The nature of the liabilities of the bankrupt firm is much 
more interesting, because it relates directly to the scholarship (discussed 
above) about the types of firms that might file for bankruptcy. Here, 
because the schedules provide insufficient information to break down the 
types of lenders in a systematic way,165 the most useful, replicable 
 
 
 161. Onix and Transcept, for example, each reported no value for their 12-patent portfolios. 
 162. Cavu and UTM each reported more than $20 million in intangible assets. Given the wide 
variation in the value of patents and other intangibles (such as license rights), it is entirely possible that 
these reports are accurate. Still, it is also true that there is great imprecision in valuing those assets. 
The possibility of over-optimistic valuation by debtors makes it at least instructive as a conservative 
baseline to examine the data on the assumption that the intangible assets in fact have no value. 
 163. For my purposes, tangible assets equal total scheduled assets reduced by amounts listed on 
the schedules for intangible assets and other contingent claims. 
 164. The likelihood remains that the values stated on the schedules for tangible assets overstate 
the values that creditors actually obtain from those assets. I do not have adequate information to 
evaluate that likelihood for this data set. 
 165. It is plain, however, that the capital structures are heterogeneous and not sufficiently simple 
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information seems to be a breakdown of total liabilities, divided between 
claims of secured creditors (that is, the total amount of claims without 
regard to collateral) and unsecured creditors. Then, I have broken the 
claims of secured creditors into secured claims166 and deficiency claims. 
Similarly, I divide unsecured claims into priority claims and nonpriority 
claims. Like the data related to assets, this must be taken cautiously, 
because debtors often report that the amounts owed to particular creditors 
are unknown. Still, the data on the schedules seems unlikely to overstate 
the debtors’ obligations. 
Table 13 summarizes the data on those points. The most obvious point 
is that the overall amount of the liabilities is substantial. Although I 
previously have written about the existence of one type of debt for 
venture-backed firms—debt extended by banks in a symbiotic relation 
with the venture investors—167the files reveal a large dollar amount of debt 
of all types.168 Because the nature of the debt differs substantially from file 
to file, it is difficult to generalize. Three points, however, seem salient. 
First, secured bank lending to these firms (the type of lending I describe in 
my prior work) is common: 29 of the 62 files report a secured creditor that 
is a bank or recognizably affiliated with a bank.169 Second, the unsecured 
creditors as a group have relatively substantial claims: the average claim is 
about $140,000.170 The other obvious generalization is that it seems likely, 
recognizing the potential understatement of claims, to think that unsecured 
to permit generalization. See Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) (arguing 
that the debt structure of venture-backed firms has increased in complexity since the mid-1990s). 
Frequently there are numerous types of secured creditors, including not only banks, but also 
substantial equipment lessors, entities that appear to be strategic partners, and entities that appear to be 
related to venture debt funds. 
 166. The calculations are, by necessity, rough. For the sake of simplicity and plausibility, I have 
calculated the secured claims on the assumption that intangible assets have no value, that tangible 
assets have their scheduled value, and that secured creditors have a claim against all tangible assets. 
 167. See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 
157–61 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Software Financing]. 
 168. This is contrary to the understanding of some. See supra note 2. 
 169. I cannot report the average amount of bank debt, because a number of the files report 
“unknown” for the amounts of debt owed to specific creditors. Although I have less complete financial 
information for the firms that did not file for bankruptcy, it is clear from VentureSource that many of 
those firms had substantial institutional financing in addition to venture capital equity investments. 
The VentureSource data also makes it plain that much of the secured debt was in place at a time when 
the firm was not in financial distress. For comparative purposes, I note the different debt structure 
found by Franks & Sussman in their database of privately held British companies: domination by a 
single bank with a group of small and dispersed trade creditors. Franks & Sussman, supra note 5. As 
Franks and Sussman suggest, there is every reason to think that the structure would be different from 
country to country, shaped in large part by the bankruptcy systems in each country. 
 170. For comparison purposes, Warren and Westbrook find a median of $905 in their study of 
business cases in Warren & Westbrook, Empirical Intervention, supra note 3. 
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creditors in many of these cases would have received a substantial 
recovery: the scheduled tangible assets for many of the firms substantially 
exceed the secured claims and priority claims. There was an excess in 32 
cases. The average case (including those with and without excesses) had 
an excess of $13.7 million; the median case had an excess of $415,000. 
Table 13: Liabilities of Chapter 11 Firms ($M) 
 Biopharm 
N=3 
Software 
N=17 
Telecom 
N=42 
Aggregate 
N=62 
Total Claims 
 
Mean 6.9 41.7 48.5 44.6 
Median 5.5 6.6 21.8 12.6 
Standard Dev.    93.9 
Sec’d 
Creditors 
 
Mean 0.80 7.3 16.0 12.8 
Median 0.18 2.3 8.3 3.2 
Standard Dev.    20.3 
Sec’d Claims 
 
Mean 0.9 2.2 10.3 7.5 
Median 0.2 1.3 3.1 1.7 
Standard Dev.    14.6 
Def’y Claims 
 
Mean 0 5.1 5.6 5.2 
Median 0 0 0 0 
Standard Dev.    13.4 
Unsec’d 
Claims 
 
Mean 6.1 34.4 33.2 32.2 
Median 5.4 2.5 9.4 7.2 
Standard Dev.    92.8 
Priority 
Claims 
 
Mean 0.08 0.18 0.39 0.32 
Median 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Standard Dev.    0.55 
Gen’l 
Unsecured 
 
Mean 6.0 34.2 32.9 31.9 
Median 5.2 2.3 9.3 7.0 
Standard Dev.    92.8 
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2. Why File for Bankruptcy? 
The unique contribution of this data set is that it gives some glimpse as 
to the reasons that firms might choose to file for bankruptcy. I address first 
the most common suggestions from recent literature and then turn to the 
reasons for selecting bankruptcy that appear from the data. 
a. Optimal Stopping 
Ed Morrison’s forthcoming work and his recent work with Douglas 
Baird emphasize the role of bankruptcy courts in making an optimal 
decision about whether a firm should be terminated.171 Ed Morrison’s 
empirical work in particular suggests that bankruptcy courts do a better job 
than previous scholars might have expected in moving quickly to 
terminate firms for which termination is warranted.172 In his analysis, 
shutdown occurs when a judge grants a secured creditor’s motion to lift 
the automatic stay, a landlord’s motion to repossess the debtor’s premises, 
or a trustee’s motion to convert the case to Chapter 7.173 Using that data, 
he finds a correlation between the presentation of cash collateral motions 
and the length of time before shutdown.174 The data I examine here do not 
contribute to that debate because cash collateral motions were so prevalent 
in the Chapter 11 firms175 and because few of the firms were the subject of 
judicial shutdown decisions. It may be that for the kinds of firms Morrison 
examines—resting so completely on individual human capital—that a 
successful motion to lift the stay by a single creditor often might shut 
down the firm. But in the bankruptcy cases examined here, most of the 
firms are not in bankruptcy because of a dispute over whether they should 
shut down. They are in bankruptcy as a step in the process of redeploying 
assets to a more productive use, which often is done by transferring a 
portion of the business as a going concern, rather than by closing the 
business entirely and liquidating the assets piecemeal.176
As discussed below, my working hypothesis (outlined in the textual 
paragraphs that follow) is that the overwhelming majority of Chapter 11 
 171. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 3; Morrison, supra note 3. 
 172. Although Morrison’s model is designed to show that bankruptcy judges make that decision in 
an optimal way, it seems to me that the most his data can show is that the decision is made reasonably 
quickly. Given the general complaints of delay by bankruptcy courts, quantitative evidence on that 
point contributes to the policy debate even if it is wholly descriptive. 
 173. See Morrison, supra note 3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Cash collateral motions were granted in 30 of my cases. 
 176. See Morrison, supra note 3. 
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filings in this data set reflect firms that are using Chapter 11 to save 
money, not in the exercise of a misguided effort to defer liquidation. Thus, 
the decision to terminate is not an important role of the bankruptcy court. 
Rather, as is well known, the capital structure of the typical venture capital 
firm operates to make it relatively unlikely that bankruptcy courts will be 
called upon to resolve a conflict between management and investors 
regarding the propriety of termination.177
The more difficult question, however, is precisely who among the 
investors does make that decision. Several of the interview subjects state 
specifically that the board of directors of the failing firm makes the 
decision.178 In the context of a venture-backed firm,179 the board of 
directors generally is controlled by the venture capitalists.180 So, in 
context, saying that a decision is made by the board is quite different in 
this context from saying that it is made by management. To be sure, in 
some cases a firm might be liquidated because management decides that 
they no longer wish to devote their time to the firm.181 In most cases, 
however, the firm is likely to liquidate if, and only if, the venture 
capitalists decide that they will not advance further equity contributions to 
the firm.182 Although the venture capitalists are likely to keep the lenders 
fully apprised of details of the deteriorating situation,183 any action of 
lenders to venture-backed firms to move aggressively against their 
 177. Two of the most obvious points are: (a) that the venture capitalists are likely to dominate the 
board of directors (see infra note 180 and accompanying text); and (b) that the firm is likely to depend 
for continued existence on the willingness of venture capitalists to continue funding despite the 
absence of any contractual obligation to do so. See, e.g., Smith & Strömberg, supra note 3; Baird & 
Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 2, at 956. 
 178. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Second California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone Interview with First Turnaround 
Professional (Sept. 21, 2004). 
 179. One possibility is that different venture capitalists have different preferences about 
liquidation alternatives. The interviews did not, however, suggest any such dynamic. For a number of 
reasons, it would be difficult to test that point quantitatively with this data set. First, for each firm there 
are generally a large number of investors, which makes it difficult to attribute the liquidation decision 
for that firm to any single investor. VentureSource does report a “lead investor,” but the population of 
lead investors is so unconcentrated (I have more than 400 in the data set) that it would be difficult to 
detect differences in liquidation preferences among lead investors. 
 180. See id.; Telephone Interview with First Professional Turnaround (Sept. 23, 2004); Fourth 
California Attorney Interview (Sept. 23, 2004). VentureSource reports the affiliation of board 
members of the portfolio firms. Although generalizations necessarily are imprecise, it is unusual for a 
firm in the data set to have a board of directors that is not controlled by venture capital investors. 
 181. See Telephone Interview with First Professional Turnaround (Sept. 21, 2004). 
 182. See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 167, at 157–61. 
 183. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone Interview 
with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004) (“[T]hat’s why I work so hard [in a liquidation of a portfolio 
firm], so . . . Silicon Valley Bank would be willing to lend to us again.”). 
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borrowers is likely to be predicated on a decision of venture capitalists to 
stop contributing.184 Moreover, in the unusual case in which lenders 
attempt to liquidate a firm that in the opinion of venture capitalists should 
not be liquidated, the venture capitalists ordinarily can sustain the firm by 
paying off the amounts owed to the lenders.185 Thus, my impression is that 
in practice the decisions about the timing and process for liquidation are 
influenced significantly—if not dominated—by the views of the venture 
capitalists, not the lenders.186
b. Reorganizing 
The classic justification for Chapter 11 is to provide an active forum 
for negotiation among interested parties over the appropriate structure of a 
reorganized firm.187 As suggested above,188 several scholars have 
contended that the role of Chapter 11 has shifted, so that reorganization is 
no longer a substantial function of Chapter 11. Not surprisingly, given the 
homogenous set of firms in the data set, there was little variation on that 
point in the files. Whether the case was nominally filed in Chapter 7 or in 
Chapter 11, the bankruptcy process was used to liquidate the firm, not to 
retain control in a reorganization. For one thing, because of the relatively 
simple capital structure typified by these firms,189 there is little need to use 
 184. See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 167, at 157–61; Telephone Interview with First 
Turnaround Professional (Sept. 21, 2004); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Sept. 
23, 2004). This is not to say the process is always consensual. In the case of Encore Software, for 
example, a Chapter 11 filing was precipitated when a tumultuous meeting between Comerica and the 
defaulting borrower caused Comerica to sweep the borrower’s accounts. Comerica was paid in full 
when the assets of the borrower were sold to Navarre in Chapter 11. 
 185. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Sept. 21, 2004). This assumes, 
as is typically the case, that the investment of the lenders is relatively small compared to the 
investment of the venture capitalists. It also is important to my view that the lenders are unlikely to 
have any plausible expectation of repayment through liquidation of collateral or the business; their 
principal expected source of repayment always will have been the venture capitalists. See Mann, 
Software Financing, supra note 167, at 157–61. Thus, this situation is quite different from the typical 
situation in which the secured creditor’s control is central to the liquidation decision. See Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 62 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004). 
 186. For a similar view, see Smith & Strömberg, supra note 3 (asserting that VCs control the 
decision to liquidate). 
 187. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Countours of the Absolute 
Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988). 
 188. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 189. The capital structure of these firms is highly homogenous. Venture capitalists generally have 
a substantial amount of preferred stock, sufficient to control the firm. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 
8, ch. 12; Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 64; Sahlman, supra note 64. As discussed above, there is a 
great deal of debt of various kinds, but in practice that seems not to complicate the process. 
Presumably, that is because much of the largest debt is held by parties with sufficient relational ties to 
the venture capitalists to minimize the potential for holdup that might lead to contentious negotiation 
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bankruptcy to reorganize the capital structure of the firm.190 For another, 
again because of the nature of the data set, the opportunity for third-party 
financing is relatively small.191 Generally, institutional lenders that make 
loans to firms of this sort depend entirely on the willingness of the venture 
capitalists to make future fundings that will be adequate to repay the 
loan.192 Firms of this sort that have filed for bankruptcy, of course, are 
firms whose venture capitalists have decided not to make further advances. 
Once venture capitalists have made that decision, they tend to be much 
more interested in liquidation than in the prospects of a reorganization in 
which they could retain an interest in a surviving firm: 
Bankruptcy is not even an option. It’s just not an option. Venture 
capitalists aren’t looking to clean up the debt and continue on with 
the company for the most part. That’s just not the mentality of 
venture capitalists. Venture capitalists have the mentality that the 
soufflé only rises once, we gave it a shot, it didn’t work, let’s get 
out of it in the cleanest way possible and move on, [in the] cleanest, 
cheapest way possible.193
In an effort to quantify this point based on the information in the files, 
it seems to me that the most relevant question is how often firms that file 
for Chapter 11 leave bankruptcy under the control of a person that was an 
equity or debt claimant before the proceeding was filed.194 Using that 
about reorganization. See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 167, at 157–61; Mann, supra note 6. 
 190. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). That point is, of 
course, consistent with the arguments of Baird & Rasmussen in their recent work, cited supra note 
155. 
 191. Thus, post-petition financing is not a major part of the data set. Post-petition financing orders 
were entered in 18 of the Chapter 11 cases. This is a contrast to the traditional perception that post-
petition financing is a major part of Chapter 11 practice in the modern era, see Skeel, supra note 157. 
In addition, see George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993) (general discussion of post-petition financing), and especially in 
technology bankruptcies, see Scott D. Cousins, Postpetition Financing of Dot-coms, 27 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 759 (2002). Most of the post-petition financing that does appear in these cases derives from funds 
contributed by a stalking horse, which are expected to come out of the proceeds of the deal that the 
stalking horse hopes to make to acquire control of the company. That was the pattern, for example, in 
Digital BroadBand, Onsite Access, Phylos, and BroadBand Office. 
 192. See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 167, at 157–61; Mann, supra note 6. 
 193. Telephone Interview with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004). 
 194. There obviously is considerable ambiguity in distinguishing plans that are “true” 
reorganizations from those that are liquidations and sales. Because most of the literature on that 
subject involves public firms, there is not a great deal of guidance on how to draw such a line in this 
data set. The premise of my analysis is that firms that leave bankruptcy in the control of somebody 
entirely new have been sold; those where the capital structure is reshuffled in some way that results in 
control by a party that was an investor or creditor before the bankruptcy are closer to reorganizations 
as traditionally conceived. 
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metric, only four of the bankruptcies involved a conventional 
reorganization: 15% of the 26 confirmed plans I have been able to 
examine and 8% of the 53 terminated cases that I have been able to 
examine.195
This is not to say that bankruptcy was never used to determine who the 
appropriate purchaser should be. For example, stalking horse bids were 
apparent at the beginning of several of the cases. It is to suggest, however, 
that the bankruptcies ordinarily did not involve negotiation over allocation 
of the proceeds of such a sale or any likelihood that the firm would 
continue in the control of those that brought it into the bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
c. Enforcing Pro Rata Treatment 
Turning to more important issues in the data set, the dominant 
consideration mentioned in the interviews is the need to file bankruptcy to 
avoid, or transfer, some interest important to a sale of the firm. Given the 
relatively small size of the firms, it is not surprising that none of the cases 
used a prepackaged bankruptcy to do this. The most common example in 
the interviews—doubtless reflecting my focus on interviews in Palo Alto 
and Austin, Texas—is something much simpler, such as an over-priced 
lease of office space or production facilities.196 One turnaround 
professional described her typical advice to clients this way: “In many 
instances I will just say, ‘Your leases are just so bad. You really should 
file a bankruptcy because they will eat up anything you have.’”197
This pattern was common in the files as well. For example, Digital 
Broadband filed for Chapter 11, rejected a major lease, and then sold much 
 195. Limitations of this data set make it difficult to tie the work closely into some of the recent 
work in the field. For example, recent work by Lynn LoPucki and his co-authors has emphasized the 
rate at which plans fail as an important criterion in assessing the effectiveness of the Chapter 11 
process. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in 
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 
(2001); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002). The plans in this data set, however, are too 
recent to get any sense for the likelihood that they will fail. In any event, it is not clear how valuable 
the information would be. Those papers assume too readily that any rate of failure of reorganized firms 
is excessive. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the 
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganization, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283 (2001). 
 196. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second 
Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround 
Professional (Mar. 12, 2004); Telephone Interview with Second California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004). 
 197. Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004). 
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of the firm to Connecticut Broadband. Similarly, DNA Sciences filed for 
Chapter 11 after negotiations with its landlord failed. After rejection of the 
lease, the business was sold to Genaissance Pharmaceuticals. The 
LayerOne bankruptcy seems to have been filed solely for the purpose of 
shedding leases in markets that a contracting firm would no longer serve. 
The files also commonly involve the rejection of equipment leases or 
contracts for the supply of circuits. In the Darwin Networks case, for 
example, the bankruptcy litigation involved rejection of a $20M 
equipment lease with Cisco and a series of service contracts with AT&T, 
followed by a sale of much of the assets of the business to US Wireless.198 
Similarly, the interviews report, the bankruptcy process is uniquely 
capable of permitting a sale that includes a transfer of an executory 
contract that otherwise might be terminated because of the general 
financial distress of the firm.199 So, for example, EC Cubed seems to have 
been in the unusual situation of having a below-market lease to transfer, 
instead of an above-market lease to reject. It needed the bankruptcy 
process, and the cooperation of its lender (Silicon Valley Bank) to transfer 
the lease to a third party. 
From some perspectives, that use of the bankruptcy process might be 
seen as wholly illegitimate. This paper certainly is not the place for a 
general assessment of that question. It is, however, plausible to suggest 
that if the provisions that permit avoidance of executory contracts work in 
a sensible way, they should have the general effect of ensuring that all 
contract creditors share in the diminution of their claims against the failed 
firm.200 The broader point is that the provisions of Section 365 that permit 
failed firms to assume, reject, or transfer contracts to third parties reflect a 
congressional policy judgment regarding the way in which difficulties 
attendant on failure should be spread.201
 198. Another common topic of litigation in those cases is whether the leases are “true” leases or 
disguised security interests, litigation that the debtors often win. In InternetConnect, for example, the 
debtor successfully recharacterized as loans purported leases from Cisco that could not be terminated 
during their term and provided for purchase by the debtor for $1 at the end of their term. Cf. UCC § 1-
203(b)(4) (2001) (“A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if [among other 
things,] the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods . . . for nominal additional 
consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.”). 
 199. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004). 
 200. It is of course not at all clear that the provisions function in a sensible way. See, e.g., Michael 
T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 
(1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 
227 (1989). 
 201. To be sure, those provisions are susceptible to abuse when firms that are not insolvent file. 
To police that problem, some courts have interpreted the “cause” standard in § 1112 to permit 
dismissal of Chapter 11 bankruptcies if the debtor is not in sufficient distress. In re Integrated Telecom 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1375 Mann book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1436 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1375 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My interest is in the effect of those provisions on the liquidation system 
as a whole. If all parties were rational, if negotiating were costless, and if 
the application of those provisions were entirely predictable, people would 
never file for bankruptcy to take advantage of those provisions. The ABC 
process (or any other out-of-court workout) would result in an allocation 
of claims negotiated in the shadow of the federal provisions. Because 
those assumptions are not always true, however, parties often need to use a 
judicial process to resolve those problems. The states, of course, cannot 
directly adopt statutes to alter contractual rights in that way.202 Thus, the 
bankruptcy process is the only forum available to enforce a pro rata 
distribution of losses attendant on financial distress. Here, a federal forum 
is necessary because the parties cannot resolve the issue by contract. 
d. Resolving Complex Litigation 
The second common example from the interviews is a major preference 
or set of preferences that the estate can recover.203 Although California’s 
ABC statute permits assignees to recover preferences on terms similar to 
those in the Bankruptcy Code,204 and although assignees report that they 
pursue those claims regularly,205 I am persuaded by the assertions in some 
of the interviews that the bankruptcy forum provides a cheaper and more 
effective forum for that kind of litigation.206
It is easy to see how Chapter 11 provides a major benefit on that score. 
The ability of a single court to handle what amounts to a series of related 
pieces of commercial litigation is a valuable attribute not readily replicated 
in a state court system that does not have nationwide authority or any 
likelihood of repeat expertise on those questions.207 For example, the main 
Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 118–24 (3d Cir. 2004); In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
1999); Liberate Technologies, 314 B.R. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). It is doubtful, however, that such 
a problem is important in my data set, where all of the firms probably are close to insolvency most of 
the time, so that a decision by venture capitalists to send the firm into bankruptcy doubtless carries 
with it financial distress and insolvency that should justify the loss-spreading provisions in question. 
 202. See generally Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2004) (discussing the boundaries between the legitimate policymaking 
spheres of Congress and the states). 
 203. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1800 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). 
 205. See Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). 
 206. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 207. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004) (explaining that it 
is “hard” for a state trial court “to swallow” the idea that it should retract funds received by a creditor 
in perfectly legitimate circumstances that amount to a preference under federal bankruptcy law). 
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feature of the Asta Networks bankruptcy was a dispute with amazon.com; 
the bankruptcy was dismissed shortly after that matter was settled.208
In some cases, the benefits that the bankruptcy court provides are not 
so much swift resolution of the dispute as they are a classic benefit of a 
stay that can hold the firm in stasis while the litigation is resolved. This 
was the case for Napster, when the bankruptcy court provided refuge 
pending the Ninth Circuit’s ultimately unfavorable resolution of the firm’s 
litigation with content providers.209
e. Industry Effects 
One of the most difficult things to understand about the data set is the 
strong industry effect: firms in different industries choose bankruptcy 
differently and choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 differently. A 
definitive understanding of those differences would require considerably 
more fieldwork. Still, it is easy to offer some general explanations for the 
two prominent industry effects that the data indicate. First, the data 
indicate that software firms are significantly less likely than the other 
firms to file for bankruptcy. As discussed above, decisions like Catapult 
make it difficult for software firms to obtain the benefits of bankruptcy 
because they cannot assume in-bound technology licenses even while in 
bankruptcy.210 Thus, at least as a relative matter, a software firm may less 
often receive substantial value for a bankruptcy filing. 
Second, although telecom firms do not file bankruptcies at an 
unusually high rate compared to firms in the other sectors, when they do 
file, they choose Chapter 11 at a rate that is significantly higher than the 
rate for firms in the other sectors. Although any generalization is 
 208. The hypothesis that the role of the bankruptcy courts in the maturing system is in large part to 
resolve complex litigation is in some tension with the rapid decline of bankruptcy trials in recent years. 
See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
913 (2004). In fact, however, the data seems to support my hypothesis when the data on business and 
non-business bankruptcy filings is disaggregated, because the disaggregated data suggests that the 
number of adversary proceedings filed in business bankruptcy cases has risen steadily over the last 
twenty years (from about 0.4 proceedings per case in 1985 to 0.7 in 2002). Id. at 933–34. To be sure, 
the share of those proceedings that have resulted in an actual trial has fallen precipitously (from 16% 
in 1985 to 3% in 2002). Id. at 935. But that trend probably says less about bankruptcy courts than it 
does about litigation in the United States more generally. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
459 (2004) (reporting various indicators of the general decline in recent decades in the use of the civil 
trial to resolve litigation). 
 209. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 210. See supra note 82 (discussing the significance of In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d at 
747). 
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necessarily simplifying, many of the telecom firms in the data set were 
operating firms with substantial pending executory contracts. They often 
were driven into bankruptcy by financial disagreements with suppliers.211 
In some cases, it might not have been specific disputes with suppliers, but 
simply a more general decline in market conditions that made it difficult 
for the firm to sustain its existing infrastructure.212 Chapter 7 for those 
firms would have resulted in a substantial loss of going-concern value as 
they lost the revenue from ongoing contracts with customers that would 
have terminated upon a Chapter 7 filing.213 In part, that is a peculiarity of 
the regulatory situation of those firms, which imposed substantial penalties 
on them if they terminated customer service without adequate notice.214 In 
contrast, software and biopharm firms at this stage would less commonly 
have large numbers of revenue-generating customers, and thus, as a 
relative matter, would have less occasion to use Chapter 11.215
To summarize the thesis of this section, Table 14 illustrates six general 
functions that can be important in the liquidation of a failed firm. The first 
 211. This seems to apply, for example, to 2d Century, Cambrian, and Point One Telecom. 
 212. Onsite Access is a good example of that situation. After successfully restructuring its affairs 
with AT&T and J.P. Morgan, it spent a year unsuccessfully negotiating with GECC and 
TransAmerica. The firm filed for bankruptcy to preserve itself during those negotiations and 
eventually was sold to ELink. 
 213. See Steven D. Pohl, Bankruptcies Cast Shadows on Three Embattled Industries, BOSTON 
BUS. J., Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2003/02/03/focus4.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (suggesting that problems with customer contracts often motivate telecom 
bankruptcies). 
 214. This was a major concern, for example, in OnSite Access. 
 215. Another common characteristic of these files is the importance of preventing utility providers 
from terminating contracts with the debtors. Many bankrupt telecommunications firms are 
“competitive local exchange carriers” (“CLEC”s), engaged in the business of reselling 
telecommunications services purchased from incumbent providers as part of deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry. See Patricia Baron Tomasco, Telecom Bankruptcies: Swimming Against 
a Tidal Wave (May 16, 2002), available at http://www.brownmccarroll.com/articles_ 
detail.asp?ArticleID=47 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). For those entities, survival is a going concern, 
directly dependent on preventing utilities from discontinuing service gives them an important 
advantage not available for the analogous suppliers to firms in other sectors. In my data set, prompt 
motions on that topic were salient in the cases of BroadBand Office, Colo.com, Darwin Networks, and 
InternetConnect. The litigation on that topic presents a complex interplay between the traditional rules 
for executory contracts in Section 365 and the special rules of Section 366 for contracts with a 
“utility.” Section 366 favors the debtor by prohibiting a “utility” from terminating services because of 
nonpayment of fees for pre-bankruptcy services, but is adverse to the debtor by requiring it promptly 
to post adequate assurance of payment for ongoing services. The application of Section 366 to the 
large-scale commercial contracts at issue in these cases remains unclear. See generally Tomasco, 
supra. The theoretical propriety of that as a use of bankruptcy is perhaps debatable. See Alan 
Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy (Apr. 29, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=alea) (last visited Sept. 
28, 2004) (arguing that business bankruptcies should not permit debtors to force their suppliers to 
continue providing service without payment). 
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column lists the functions that contractual negotiations between the parties 
can resolve. The last two columns list the functions that the bankruptcy 
court necessarily needs to perform. 
Table 14: Benefits of Contract and Bankruptcy Liquidation 
 Contract 
Liquidation 
Bankruptcy 
Liquidation 
Locating Purchaser X  
Setting Price X  
Defining Capital 
Structure X  
Administering 
Estate X 
 
Enforcing Pro Rata 
Treatment  
X 
Resolving Complex 
Litigation  
X 
 
3. The Efficacy of the Liquidation System 
Once we know more about the functions that the bankruptcy process 
can—and cannot—serve in a system for the liquidation of failed firms, we 
are in a better position to evaluate the functions that Congress has 
allocated to the bankruptcy courts.216 The most obvious issue is raised by 
the weighty body of bankruptcy literature in the 1990s asserting that the 
bankruptcy process, particularly Chapter 11, works so poorly that some 
form of mandatory auction should replace it.217 The papers that make that 
criticism implicitly rest on the twin assumptions that: (a) the existing 
process does a poor job of redirecting assets of failed firms to better uses; 
 
 
 216. This paper advocates a system that allocates the functions necessary for liquidation of failed 
firms to the actor best placed to fulfill them. In general, that allocation ultimately should lower the cost 
of capital for those firms by lowering the losses attendant on liquidation. See Schwartz, supra note 
215. 
 217. That idea has been promulgated in various forms in four separate lines of scholarship: by 
Barry Adler, see, for example, Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing 
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 (2001); Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); by Aghion, Hart & Moore, see, for example, Phillippe 
Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994); Phillippe Aghion et al. 
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); by Lucian Bebchuk, see, for 
example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
775 (1988); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy, 44 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 829 (2000); and by Douglas Baird, see, for example, Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting 
Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993). 
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and (b) the bankruptcy process needs to do little other than accomplish 
that task. The evidence presented in the last section, albeit inconclusive 
and anecdotal, undermines both of those assumptions. 
The preceding sections of this paper present a system in which ABCs 
and bankruptcies are interacting (at least in California), sorting firms to a 
forum in which their assets can be redirected rapidly. Two points about 
that system are salient here. One, if firms that have no need for 
complicated litigation are using ABCs, the sorting function is working. 
Two, it appears that the bankruptcy process is serving a variety of 
functions that would need to be accomplished even in a mandatory auction 
system. Thus, as discussed above, bankruptcies are particularly common 
in cases in which recalcitrant creditors (often lessors) are unwilling to 
accept the reduction of their rights commensurate with pro rata treatment. 
Similarly, it appears common that in the days before failure creditors will 
have received preferences. Although it might be optimal to transfer the 
assets rapidly (as we see from the ABC process), it remains necessary in 
some forum to pursue litigation to recover those preferences. In cases 
where that litigation is anything other than trivial, the bankruptcy forum 
needs to remain available for that purpose. In cases in which the outcome 
of disputed litigation is sufficiently uncertain and important to influence 
the ultimate disposition of the firm (Napster being a good example in the 
data set), it may be that the bankruptcy process is necessary to shelter the 
firm while that litigation can be conducted. 
That chain of reasoning suggests that the reasoning of the auction 
theorists is fundamentally flawed. Specifically, my analysis suggests that 
their proposals, if implemented rigorously, would remove from the 
bankruptcy courts the issues that only the bankruptcy process can resolve 
(the points discussed in the previous section) and bring into the process the 
issue that most clearly can be resolved outside of bankruptcy—selection of 
the optimal purchaser and completion of a prompt sale. If the purpose of 
bankruptcy reform is to make the system as a whole more efficient,218 
those reforms might be counterproductive. 
To be sure, the discussion in this section does rest in part on the sense 
that—at least in the areas relevant to the data set—the process in the 
bankruptcy proceedings in the set is sufficiently streamlined to be 
practical. There has been a great deal of concern that the bankruptcy 
process does not work well, except for the largest businesses. One concern 
 218. See Schwartz, supra note 215. 
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has been that the process is too cumbersome for creditors.219 The data set 
provides some interesting evidence on that point because it is a specific 
slice of reasonably large, though not public, bankrupts. The evidence 
about motions to convert and appointments of trustees, for example, 
suggests that creditors are readily capable of participating in the process.220 
Similarly, as the data below (regarding the time that elapses before plan 
confirmation or dismissal) indicates, this is not a process where debtors 
routinely use exclusivity motions to defer the moment of reckoning for 
long periods. Here, at least, the debtor is not in full control. 
There also is pervasive concern about the delay inherent in small 
business bankruptcies.221 On that point, although different people will have 
different views about what counts as prompt, the bankruptcies in the data 
set for the most part proceeded relatively promptly. Figure 6 shows the 
outcomes of the 66 Chapter 11s, divided among the cases in which plans 
have been confirmed, those converted to Chapter 7, those dismissed, and 
the cases in which proposed plans are still pending.222 Figure 7 shows the 
mean time to those outcomes, which were generally considerably less than 
a year.223 If the firms in the data set can move through Chapter 11 that 
quickly, it is difficult to credit the notion that Chapter 11 is systematically 
impractical for all but the largest publicly traded firms. 
 219. E.g., LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control (Parts I & II), supra note 3; see also 1 NAT’L 
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 642 (1997). 
 220. In the 66 Chapter 11 cases, 20 were converted to Chapter 7s and four had trustees appointed. 
 221. E.g., 1 NAT’L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 219, at 613–14. 
 222. There are no pending cases in which plans have not been proposed. 
 223. The medians did not differ materially from the means that I report here. The eight pending 
cases are such a small part of the data set that it seems unlikely that they ultimately will increase the 
average outcome shown here substantially. Interestingly, the four reorganization plans in the 
population were confirmed in much less than a year, all in the range of six to eight months. 
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4. Making Chapter 7 More Effective 
The last avenue for inquiry is whether bankruptcy policymakers can 
learn from the benefits of the ABC experience. Although this Article is not 
the place to explore that topic in detail, it is evident that the principal 
comparative advantage of the ABC process is the skill of the liquidator. It 
might be possible to capture much of that advantage in the bankruptcy 
process by the simple device of permitting Chapter 7 bankrupts to opt for a 
private trustee, with the trustee’s higher fee to be paid by consenting 
creditors. Chapter 11 bankrupts already have control over bankruptcy 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/5
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operations for the most part through their ability to remain in 
possession.224 It is not clear why something similar could not be 
accomplished in Chapter 7. 
This, of course, would not capture all of the benefits of an ABC 
process because an important advantage of the ABC process is that it is 
quicker than bankruptcy, and would involve the expense of participation in 
the bankruptcy process. Among other things, any special Chapter 7 
appointment would necessarily involve judicial involvement. It is possible, 
however, that it might increase the payouts in firms that need to file for 
bankruptcy and have insufficient assets to successfully navigate Chapter 
11 but prefer an experienced and hands-on liquidator. Similarly, it might 
allow some firms that need access to bankruptcy solely to conduct 
expedited litigation before transferring assets to a third party to use a 
cheaper Chapter 7 process rather than the more expensive Chapter 11 
process that they use now. The data reported above—which indicate that 
only a small share of the Chapter 11 cases in the data set involve “true” 
reorganizations—coupled with the interviews that suggest that the high 
costs of Chapter 11 drive liquidation choices225 suggest that this simple 
proposal might be quite beneficial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has two main points. First, it argues that states can improve 
the efficacy with which the assets of failed firms are redirected to 
profitable uses by adopting procedures that are more hospitable to ABCs. 
Those procedures, the data suggest, should redirect a substantial number 
of failed firms from expensive and protracted bankruptcy proceedings to 
more expeditious proceedings conducted under the protection of a state 
court. The major caveat to that argument is that the system needs to be at 
once attentive to the possibility of abuse and at the same time sufficiently 
streamlined to be attractive to the failed firms. 
 224. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1107 (2000). To the extent those firms wish to employ a turnaround 
professional, they of course could appoint such a person as Chief Reorganizing Officer, a common 
occurrence in large-firm bankruptcies in recent years. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, 
Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1935, 1944–45 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1917–18 
(2004). 
 225. The bankruptcy policy questions are complex. Among other things, it is not clear why in 
practice it is so difficult for firms to obtain special Chapter 7 appointments under existing law. See 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 22. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1375 Mann book pages.doc6/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1444 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1375 
 
 
 
 
Second, arising out of the first, analysis of liquidation choices is an 
ideal way to understand the role of bankruptcy courts in dealing with the 
liquidation of failed firms. I argue here—at least for the sectors that I 
examine—that bankruptcy courts have an important role in that process 
but that the role is quite different from the traditional role as evidenced by 
the major substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, the 
most important roles of the bankruptcy court for the firms are: (a) to 
provide a backstop for cases in which the parties cannot agree upon an 
appropriate allocation of losses among themselves; and (b) to provide a 
convenient forum for complex litigation that practicably cannot be 
conducted in state courts. Similar research in other areas doubtless would 
reveal other situation-specific functions of the bankruptcy courts, but the 
understanding of their role for venture-backed high-tech firms is 
interesting in its own right. 
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